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I.

INTRODUCTION

Employers have strong economic incentives to classify workers as
independent contractors because the classification relieves them of
statutory obligations and liabilities under a wide range of federal
labor laws which apply only to employees.' As a consequence, classification has become a growing concern because workers classified
as independent contractors are constructively removed from the
legal protections Congress designed to safeguard employees and
regulate the employer-employee relationship.
Preeminent among the federal labor laws that employers may
avoid by classifying employees as independent contractors is the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).2 Under section 2(3) of the
1. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (current version at
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994)).
2. Id.
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Act, independent contractors are excluded from the definition of
"employee," and thus are not guaranteed the rights to organize,
join unions, or bargain collectively. 3 Employers, therefore, have

been able to dodge unionization by creating new classes of
independent contractors beyond the reach of NLRA protections.4
In response, several commentators have called for a reformulation of the common law test for defining contractor status under the
NLRA.5 These proposed tests include consideration of the economic realities or inquiries into the entrepreneurial nature of the
employment relationship.6 In December 1996, the National Labor
Relations Board heard oral arguments in a set of cases in which it
raised the issue of reformulating the test for independent contractor
status.7
Originally, the Wagner Act,8 enacted by Congress in 1935, did
not contain an exclusion for independent contractors under the definition of "employee." 9 At the time, section 2(3) of the Act provided that "[t]he term 'employee' shall include any employee," with
explicit exceptions only for agricultural laborers, domestic servants,
and persons hired by a parent or spouse. 10 However, because
independent contractors traditionally had been excluded from the
class of employees at common law,1 ' the Board exempted
independent contractors from NLRA coverage even without an
express statutory exclusion.' 2 From 1935 to 1944, the Board determined the line between employees and contractors by applying the
traditional principles of the common law test, and in close cases
13
considered other factors relevant to the purposes of the NLRA.
In 1944, this approach was reviewed and upheld by the United
States Supreme Court in NLRB v. HearstPublications,Inc.14 Three
3. See id. § 157.
4. See Jonathan P. Hiatt & Lee W. Jackson, Union Survival Strategiesfor the Twentyfirst Century, 12 LAB. LAW. 165, 177 (1996).
5. See infra Part II.C.
6. See infra Part II.C.
7. See infra Part II.D.
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69.
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
10. See id.
11. See infra Part IMl.A.
12. See infra Part IV.A. & B.1. & 2.
13. See infra Part IV.A. & B.1. & 2.
14. 322 U.S. 111 (1944); see infra Part V.B.4.
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years later, the Taft-Hartley Act of 194715 amended the section 2(3)
definition and added an express exclusion for independent contractors. 6 In the committee report that proposed the amendment,
House members extensively attacked the Board and the Hearst
opinion.' 7 The final conference agreement, however, rejected most
of the House report's language and concluded merely that the
Hearst Court improperly allowed the Board to ignore "the ordinary
tests of the law of agency" in deciding whether certain occupational
groups were employees under the Act.' 8
In order to understand today's controversy over modifying the
Board's test for employee under section 2(3), this Article analyzes
whether it is feasible for the Board to add new inquiries into
entrepreneurial independence or the relative dependence of
employees to its existing common law test. Toward this end, Part II
outlines the rising use and misuse of the independent contractor
classification, the calls by commentators to alter the common law
test, and the current case involving this issue now pending before
the Board. Part III summarizes the principles of the common law
of agency as they existed when the NLRA was enacted, as well as
the intent of the drafters of the Wagner Act of 1935 with respect to
the interpretation of section 2(3). Part IV evaluates the early
Board decisions from 1935 to 1944 on the issue of independent contractor status, details the Board's pre-Hearsttest, and analyzes the
Hearst case and its enunciation of the factors of economic dependency. Then, in an effort to determine the intent of Congress's
Taft-Hartley amendment which added the express exclusion for
independent contractors, Part V analyzes the congressional record
of the 1947 amendment to section 2(3) and concludes that the sole
directive of Congress was that the Board and courts must adhere to
the principles of agency. Part VI argues that the principles of
agency which the 1947 Congress instructed the Board to follow
15. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994)).

16. See id. Ch. at 120, tit. I, § 101, 61 Stat. at 137 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)
(1994)). The Taft-Hartley Act's exemption reads: "The term 'employee' . . . shall not
include ... any individual having the status of an independent contractor .... ." Id. § 152(3).
17. See H.R. RP. No. 80-245, at 18 (1947), reprintedin 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY
OF TirE LABOR MANAGEMENT RLATIONS Acr, 1947, at 292, 309 (1948); see also infra Part
V.A. (discussing the House Committee Report).
18. See H.R. REP. No. 80-510, at 135 (1947), reprintedin 1947 U.S.C.C.S. at 1135,1138;
see also infra Part V.B. (discussing the Conference Committee Report).
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actually permit the Board to consider a range of additional factors,
including additional facts indicating the independence associated
with entrepreneurs and the dependence coincident with employee
status. Finally, Part VI argues that the Board's adoption of this
more flexible approach is supported fully under the current cases of
the United States Supreme Court.
II.

A.

BACKGROUND

Expansion of the Use and Misuse of Independent Contractors

In recent years, employers have increasingly expanded the use of
independent contractors for the stated purposes of gaining flexibility in the employment relationship and lowering costs so that their
businesses are more competitive in today's national and international markets. 19 Employers have strong economic incentives to
classify workers as independent contractors because the definition
relieves them of statutory obligations to contribute to Social Security, unemployment insurance, workers' compensation, income tax
withholding, and employee benefits. 2 ° Employers who are able to
19. See U.S. Dep'ts of Labor and Commerce, Commission on the Future of WorkerManagement Relations, Report and Recommendations 35 (Dec. 1994) [hereinafter Dunlop
Report]. Current trends in corporate downsizing and rightsizing also have increased the
conversion of technical and consulting employees to independent contractor status. See
Independent ContractorStatus: HearingBefore the House Comm. on Small Bus., 104th Cong.
1, 7-8 (1995) (testimony of Claudia Hill, Nat'l Ass'n of Enrolled Agents) [hereinafter House
Hearing on Independent ContractorStatus].
In addition to independent contractors, employers utilize other types of "contingent"
work-including temporary, part-time, seasonal, and leased labor-which are receiving the
scrutiny of commentators. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, The Labor Market Transformed: Adapting Labor and Employment Law to the Rise of the Contingent Work Force, 52
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 879 (1995); Jonathan P. Hiatt, Policy Issues Concerning the Contingent
Work Force, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 739 (1995); Jonathan P. Hiatt & Lee W. Jackson,
Union Survival Strategiesfor the Twenty-first Century, 12 LAB. LAw. 165 (1996); Edward A.
Lenz, "Contingent Work"-Dispelling the Myth, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 755 (1995);
Patricia Schroeder, Does the Growth in the Contingent Work Force Demand a Change in
Federal Policy?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 731 (1995).
20. See House Hearing on Independent ContractorStatus, supra note 19, at 35-36; see
also Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F.3d 1187, 1189 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Large corporations
have increasingly adopted the practice of hiring temporary employees or independent
contractors as a means of avoiding payment of employee benefits, and thereby increasing
their profits."); House Hearing on Independent Contractor Status, supra note 19, at 4
(testimony of Craig Willett, Willett and Assoc.) (stating that from the perspective of an
employer who hires independent contractors, one goal is "to make the most amount of profit
possible with the least amount of cost in so doing"); House Hearing on Independent
ContractorStatus, supra note 19, at 11 (testimony of Marc S. Wagner, H.D. Vest Fn. Serv.)
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label workers as independent contractors also avoid liability under
a number of federal labor statutes, including laws that protect collective bargaining and prohibit employment discrimination.21
Workers who have the same economic needs as employees, but
who instead are classified as independent contractors, are more
economically burdened than employees because they must pay both
the employer and employee portions of Social Security, and fend
for their own health, unemployment, disability, and retirement
needs. 22 These workers also suffer the loss of a broad range of
employment protections that apply only to employees. 23 As one
congressional leader described the converted worker's predicament, "When an employer switches a worker from employee to
contractor status, he is in effect cutting him or her adrift, depriving
the worker of essential, congressionally-mandated support. '24 In
most cases, workers have no choice but to accept the employer's
decision to define a job as an independent contractor position, and
many workers are uninformed about the loss of employee protec("the cost of a worker versus a subcontractor increases by 25 percent"); Exploiting Workers
by Misclassifying Them as Independent Contractors,Hearing Before the Employment and
Hous. Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations,102d Cong. 2 (1991) (opening
statement of Chairman Tom Lantos) ("Clearly, saving money on benefits and the paperwork
associated with them is a strong motivation. An employer who can save over one-third on
labor costs can usually underbid a competitor.") [hereinafter House Hearing on
Misclassification].
21. See DuNLoP REPORT, supra note 19, at 36; see also infra note 23.
22. See Coopers & Lybrand, Projection of the Loss in Federal Tax Revenues Due To
Misclassificationof Workers, 2 (1994) (prepared for Coalition for Fair Worker Classification)
(citing a 1989 GAO study), reprinted in House Hearing on Independent ContractorStatus,
supra note 19, at 58-89.
23. See, e.g., The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 20 U.S.C. § 623 (1994)
(providing protections against age discrimination in employment); National Labor Relations
Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 151, § 157) (granting rights to
organize, join unions, bargain collectively, or join in concerted activities); The Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (1994) (defining "employee" as anyone employed by an
employer); The Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 652(6)(1994)(defining an
"employee" as anyone "who is employed in a business of his employer which affects
commerce"); The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(6)(1994)(outlining federal regulation of employee benefit plans); Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2000(e)-17(1994)(providing protections
against employment discrimination on the basis of race, sex, national origin, or religious
belief). For a good overview of the different tests for independent contractor currently being
used under various federal labor laws, see Richard R. Carlson, Variations on a Theme of
Employment: Labor Law Regulation of Alternative Worker Relations,37 S. TEx. L. REv. 661,
661-87 (1996).
24. See House Hearings on Misclassification,supra note 20, at 2 (opening statement of
Chariman Tom Lantos).
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tions they will suffer by accepting a job that carries the contractor
label. Moreover, classification schemes are prevalent in sectors of
the low-wage work force where unskilled workers who have little
bargaining power must assume contractor status in order to be
employed.2 6
Beyond the economic strategy of classifying workers as
independent contractors whenever it is possible legally to manipulate the technicalities of the law, an increasing number of employers
also are engaging in the deliberate and illegal misclassification of
employees, a practice that is widespread and growing. 7 One government study, for example, found that thirty-eight percent of
employers who filed documentation stating they had paid wages to
independent contractors had, in fact, misclassified employees.2 ' A
second study estimated the number of misclassified American
workers will exceed five million by the year 2005.29
B.

Problems Resulting From the Classification of Independent
Contractors in the NLRA Context

Foremost among the federal labor laws that employers may avoid
by classifying employees as independent contractors is the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA)3 0 Under section 2(3) of the Act,
independent contractors are excluded from the definition of
employee, 31 and thus are not guaranteed the rights to organize, join
unions, or bargain collectively.32 Employers, therefore, may sidestep unionization by creating new classes of independent contractors beyond the reach of NLRA protections. It is claimed that
25. See House Hearings on Misclassification,supra note 20, at 2 (opening statement of
Chariman Tom Lantos).
26. See Hiatt, supra note 19, at 749-50.
27. See House Hearingon Misclassification,supra note 20, at 176 (opening statement of
Chairman Tom Lantos).
28. See Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 22, at 71.
29. See Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 22, at 63.

30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994), amended by ch. 120, tit. I, § 101, 61 Stat. 137 (1947) ("The
term 'employee'

..

. shall not include,., any individual having the status of an independent

contractor.").

32. Section 7 of the NLRA provides: "Employees shall have the right to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ....
" 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1994).
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under the current test for the definition of employee, employers
readily can avert shop unionization
by simply varying certain terms
33
or conditions of employment:
For example, by taking money from taxicab drivers rather than
giving money to them, taxicab companies have succeeded in virtually eliminating employees from the taxicab industry and transforming almost all cab drivers into independent contractors. The
trucking industry has followed a similar course. This trend has
gone so far that one Seattle cleaning contractor, after submitting
the lowest bid to clean downtown office buildings, proceeded to
sell "franchises" for the right to clean floors ...

for $4,000 to

$7,000 a floor - transforming low-wage janitors, mostly immigrants from 34Central America and Asia, into "independent
contractors.,

Moreover, several commentators have viewed the trend toward
increased use of independent contractors as precipitating not only
the erosion of unionization at individual shops, but also as a challenge to the union movement as a whole.3
C. Calls for a New or Modified Test for Determining
Independent ContractorStatus Under the NLRA
In response to this trend by employers to evade unionization and
collective bargaining by manipulating the common law test for
''employee," several commentators called for the reformulation of
the test for defining contractor status to include consideration of
the economic realities of the work relationship.36 The Dunlop
Commission, for example, recommended that the test for determining the line between employee and independent contractor "should
be based on the economic realities underlying the relationship"
between worker and employer, rather than "the control test borrowed from the old common law of master and servant. ' 37 Similarly, Charles B. Craver argued for a return to the same economic
33. See Hiatt & Jackson, supra note 19, at 177.
34. Hiatt & Jackson, supra note 19, at 177. For additional information on the problem
of "franchising," see House Hearing on Misclassification,supra note 20, at 177-85 (testimony
of Tom Balanoff, Bldg. Serv. Div. Dir., SEIU).
35. See, e.g., CARL..s B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SuRviE?: THE REUVENATION OF
TE A ERicAN LABOR MOVEMENT 139-40 (1993); Hiatt & Jackson, supra note 19, at 177.
36. See CRAVER, supra note 35, at 140.
37. DUNLOp REPORT, supra note 19, at 36; see also Hiatt & Jackson, supra note 19, at

177 ("The Dunlop Commission's recommendation ... merits far more attention than it has
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realities test outlined in NLRB v. Hearst Publications,Inc. 8 which
was a target of Congress in the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendment to
the NLRA.39 Another commentator has suggested that the version
of the economic dependency test used to define employee under
the Fair Labor Standards Act might be imported for use under the
NLRA.40 Beyond these possible economic considerations, the Service Employees Independent Union (SEIU) has suggested that the
NLRA test for independent contractor status should be based on
inquiries into the entrepreneurial nature of the employment relationship which should exist if a worker is truly an independent
contractor.41
D. The Issue Is Now Before the Board: The Roadway Cases
After several years of commentary, the issue of reformulating the
definitional test for employee under the NLRA has recently
reached the Board for review and its decision is still pending. In
December 1996, the Board heard oral arguments in a set of consolidated cases in which the parties and amici curiae raised the issue of
what is included in the proper common law inquiry for determining
contractor status under the NLRA.42 Both of these cases, Roadway
Package System, Inc.43 and Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp.,"
received."). But see CRAVER, supra note 35, at 140 (noting that the Dunlop Commission did

not cite Hearst Publicationsin its discussion of economic realities).
38. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
39. See CRAVER, supra note 35, at 140 ("Modifying Section 2(3) to incorporate the
Hearst Publications'economic realities' test would enable individuals who do not fall within
the traditional definition of 'employee' but nevertheless retain little or no control over the
terms and conditions of their employment to benefit from the protections of the NLRA.");

see also infra Part IV.B.4.c.
40. See Hiatt, supra note 19, at 750 ("Courts have considered a variety of factors to
determine 'economic dependence,' including the degree of control exercised over the
individual, the skill required to perform the job, the location of the work, and the control

over compensation.").
41. See Hiatt, supra note 19, at 750 (citing considerations such as who bears the risk of
loss, who schedules or otherwise controls work time, who controls manner of payment,
whether the work is integral to the client's enterprise, and whether the worker holds him or
herself out to the public as available to render services beyond that connected with the

employer).
42. See Labor and Management Revisit NLRB Test for Independent Contractor,DAILY

LAB. REP.No. 233, at A-8 (Dec. 4, 1996).
43. Roadway Package System, Inc., Nos. 31-RC-7267 & 31-RC-7277 (Dec. 3, 1996)

(involving the Teamsters Local 63).
44. Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., No. 29-RC-8442 (Dec. 3, 1996) (involving the

Teamsters Local 363).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

9

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 4
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

[Vol. 15:75

involve efforts by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters to
organize truck drivers at two California package delivery terminals
and a New York trucking facility.45 At each trucking site, the
Teamsters filed representation petitions which the companies
opposed by asserting that their drivers could not be organized
because they were independent contractors expressly excluded
from NLRA coverage.46
Generally, Roadway's package and delivery business operates
through a network of interstate terminals and hub facilities. 47 Customers tender packages for pickup and delivery drivers bring them
to the local terminal where they then are routed to a hub facility,
sorted, and loaded to go out to destination terminals for delivery.48
Then, at each terminal, the pickup and delivery drivers, who are the
49
subject of the dispute, deliver the packages to local addresses.
Overall, Roadway operates a delivery system comparable to its
competitor, the United Parcel Service.50
In Roadway I, the first of two earlier cases involving this issue,
the Board rejected Roadway's independent contractor defense and
found that the truck drivers at its Louisville trucking terminal were
employees under section 2(3).52 There, the Board found that the
drivers were employees rather than independent contractors
because Roadway exercised substantial control over the manner
and means of performing the pickup and delivery of packages.53
Illustrating the complex balancing of considerations used to decide
employee status under the Act, the Board noted that:
We recognize, as is normal in this type of case, that there are
factors that support independent contractor status, namely, the
drivers' responsibility for vehicle expenses, workers' compensation and unemployment compensation; the lack of wage withholdings or benefits accorded other employees; and the drivers'
45. See Labor and Management Revisit NLRB Test for Independent Contractor,supra

note 42.
46. See Labor and Management Revisit NLRB Test for Independent Contractor,supra
note 42.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See Roadway Package Systems, Inc., 292 N.L.R.B. 376, 379 (1989).
See id.
See id.
See id.
Roadway Package Systems, Inc., 288 N.L.R,B. 196 (1988).
See id. at 199.
See id at 198-99.
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limited ability to flex and turn in sales leads. In our opinion,
however, these do not outweigh the Employer's significant control over the manner and means of performing the pickup and
delivery of packages 54and the drivers' relative lack of
entrepreneurial freedom.
In a subsequent NLRB case brought against it for six separate
complaints of discrimination, Roadway argued that the Board
should reopen an earlier representation case in which a regional
director determined that Roadway's drivers at its Redford, Michi5
gan terminal were employees.Y
In that case, Roadway 1H, the
Board held that there was no reason to reexamine the regional
director's findings that
entrepreneurial decisions affecting the drivers' profit and loss
picture are not made by the drivers, and that [Roadway] tells the
drivers how to perform their work tasks well beyond the point of
simply dictating the result, or his conclusion that the drivers are
employees and not independent contractors.5 6
Thus, the present case before the Board is Roadway's third attempt
to have its delivery drivers declared independent contractors so
they would be precluded from achieving collective bargaining or
union protection which they have sought.
Now, in Roadway III, Roadway argues that the Roadway I holding does not control the current case "because of the numerous and
dramatic changes that have occurred in the contractors' relationship
with RPS through the implementation of the 1994 Agreement."5 7
In fact, Roadway admits that it had Roadway I specifically "in
mind" when it drafted the 1994 contract which all of its drivers
must
5s
agree to in order to work for Roadway:
When RPS redefined the 1994 Agreement, it did so with [Roadway 1] and other Board cases in mind. RPS specifically eliminated many of the factors relied on by the Board in [Roadway I]
so that they reflect independent contractor status. Thus, under
the 1994 Agreement, the contractors have significantly more control over their job performance .

.

.

. In contrast to the

54. Id. at 199.
55. See Roadway Package Systems, Inc., 292 N.L.R.B. 376, 376 (1989).

56. Id. at 378 (citing Roadway Package Systems, Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 196 (1988)).
57. Pre-argument Brief for Roadway at 35, Roadway Package System, Inc., Nos. 31-RC-

7267 & 31-RC-7277 (Dec. 3, 1996).
58. See id. at 36.
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entrepreneurial interests missing in [Roadway I], current contractors operating under the 1994 Agreement have a proprietary
interest in their service areas and have discretion to sell their
59
routes and their trucks at the best price they can negotiate.
In other words, Roadway Ii stands as an example of an employer
classification scheme designed to convert a segment of employees
to independent contractors and thereby avoid the unionization and
collective bargaining desired by its employees.
Showing its apparent willingness to consider a reformulation of
the test, the Board in Roadway II1 asked the parties to address the
following questions in their pre-argument briefs:
Under prevailing precedent, the Board determines an individual's status as an employee within the meaning of § 2(3) of the
Act or an independent contractor excluded from the protection
of the NLRA by applying the common law right of control test to
the particular facts of the case at hand. Does the Board have the
authority to change or modify that 60standard? If so, should any
changes or modifications be made?
Potentially hanging in the balance of this inquiry are the organizing
rights of the drivers at all of Roadway's 370 delivery facilities, as
well as the organizing rights of their counterparts at similar businesses. Also, NLRA coverage of other occupational groups in
which the line between employee and independent contractor has
been closely drawn will be implicated by any change in the current
Board test. These occupational groups include traditionally disputed categories such as taxicab drivers, newspaper carriers, and
performers, 61 as well as newer classes created in recent years by
employer classification schemes.62
III.

THE

LAW RELEVANT TO INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR

STATUS AT THE

TiME

CONGRESS ENACTED THE

NLRA

In order to understand the history of independent contractor status through the developments of the Board's early decisions from
1935 to 1944, the United States Supreme Court's Hearst opinion,
and Congress's Taft-Hartley amendment to section 2(3) in 1947, it is
59. Id. at 36-37.
60. Respondent's Pre-argument Brief at 1-2, Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., No. 29-

RC-8442 (Dec. 3, 1996).
61. See 2 PATRICK HARDIN, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1622-33 (3d ed. 1992).
62. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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necessary to examine the common law principles of agency used to
determine independent contractor status as they existed at the time

the National Labor Relations Act passed, and to consider the original intent of the Wagner Act's drafters with regard to the meaning

of employee under section 2(3) of the Act.
A.

The Principles of Agency

In 1933, two years before the passage of the NLRA, the Ameri-

can Law Institute completed its Restatement of the Law of Agency,
the purpose of which was to gather, analyze, and explain the common law of agency.63 Section 220 of the Restatement contained the
principles for determining servant status, and listed the common
law factors that courts most often considered in determining the

line between employees and independent contractors. 64 Specifically, section 220(2) provided:6"
In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an
independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among
others, are considered: (a) the extent of control which, by the
agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the
work,6 6 (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a dis63. See

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY Introduction (1933).
64. See id. § 220.
65. See id. § 220(2) (emphasis and footnotes added). The Second Restatement retained
all of these factors without any change in their wording, but added one factor: "(j) whether
the principal is or is not in business." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY

§ 220(2) (1958).
66. See RESTATEMENT (FrosT) OF T
LAW OF AGENCY § 220(2)(a) (1933); see id. at
§ 220 cmt. c ("Those rendering service but retaining control over the manner of doing it are
not servants.") (using same language retained in comment e of the Restatement (Second));
id. § 220 cmt. e ("The custom of the community as to the control ordinarily exercised in a
particular occupation is of importance. This, together with the [level of] skill which is
required in the occupation, is often of almost conclusive weight.") (same language retained in
comment i of the Restatement (Second)).
In the American Law Institute [hereinafter ALI] tentative draft of 1926, the fact that a
worker was "left in control of the operation of the forces and instrumentalities by which the
stipulated result is to be accomplished" was an "essential characteristic." RESTATEMENT OF
AGENCY (Tentative Draft No. 11, 1926) § 6. Without this essential retention of absolute
control, the status of independent contractor reverted to a servant classification: "The
characteristics stated as usual may be varied, but the one designated as essential may not be
destroyed without destroying the relation." Id. at 12. The ALI final draft also contained
absolute language, defining an independent contractor as a person "who is not controlled by
the other nor subject to the other's right to control in respect to his physical conduct in the
performance of the undertaking." RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY (Proposed Final Draft No. 24,
1926) § 2. Under this absolute view, any control exercised or any retention of the right to
control by an employer would destroy independent contractor status.
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tinct occupation or business; 67 (c) the kind of occupation, with

reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done
under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without
supervision; 68 (d) the skill required in the particular occupation;69 (e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person
doing the work;7 0 (f) the length of time for which the person is
employed;7 1 (g) the method of payment, whether by the time or
by the job;72 (h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular
References to the absolute nature of the right to control are found widely in the earlier
twentieth century treatises on agency. See, e.g., GLEASON L. ARCHER, THE LAW OF AGENCY
10 (1915) (stating that for independent contractor status to exist, the employer "retains no
control over the workmen employed by the contractor and takes no part whatever in
directing the work"); ERNEST W. HuicruT, Trm LAW OF AGENCY 9 (1901) ("The test usually
applied is whether the employer retains any control, or right to control, over the means or
methods by which the work is to be accomplished. If he does, the employee is a servant.").
But see MERTON FERSON, PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY § 41 (1954) ("The right to control is an
incident. It is much used as a test, but it is not a fact that fixes the worker's status.").
The absolute character of the control factor, however, is less apparent from the definition
adopted in the Restatement. Section 220's definition of servant stated that a servant is a
person "who, with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the service, is subject
to the other's control or right to control." See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF
AGENCY Introduction § 220(1) (1933). By shifting the wording from the negative not
controlled by, to the positive, is subject to the other's control, the language loses much of its
absolute tone. However, there is no indication from the draft materials that the ALI drafters
intended any historical shift away from the generally accepted, absolute nature of the control
factor.
67. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY Introduction § 220(2)(b)
(1933).
68. Id.§ 220(2)(c).
69. I. § 220(2)(d); see id. § 220 cmt. e ("Unskilled labor is usually performed by those
customarily regarded as servants, and a laborer is almost conclusively a servant in spite of the
fact that he may nominally contract to do a specified job for a specified price.") (using same
language retained in comment i of the Restatement (Second)).
70. Id. § 220(2)(e); see id. § 220 cmt. g
The fact that a worker supplies his own tools is some evidence that he is not a
servant. On the other hand, if the worker is using his employer's tools or
instrumentalities, especially if they are of substantial value, it is normally
understood that he will follow the direction of the owner in their use and hence this
indicates that the owner is a master.
Id. (using same language retained in comment k of the Restatement (Second)).
71. See id. § 220(2)(f); see id. § 220 cmt. f ("If the time of employment is short, the
worker is less apt to subject himself to control as to the details and the job is more likely to
be considered his job than the job of the one employing him.") (same language retained in
comment j. of the Restatement (Second)); id. § 220 cmt. a. (stating that a servant is a worker
who "performs continuous service for another") (same language retained in comment a of
the Restatement (Second)).
72. See id. § 220(2)(g); id. § 220 cmt. f
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business of the employer;73 and (i) whether or not the parties

believe they are creating the relationship of master and servant.7 4

The comments to section 220 further explained that an employee
is a person "who performs continuous service," and that the status
of being a servant indicates a "closeness of the relationship between
the one giving and the one receiving the service. ' 75 The comments
also specified that an important distinction of independent contractor status was whether "the actor's physical activities and his time
are surrendered to the control of the master," or whether instead
'76
the employment was arranged "to accomplish results.
The Restatement also provided triers of fact guidance in the
application of the common law test, explaining that "[tlhe relationship of master and servant is one not capable of exact definition,"
that this relationship cannot be defined in general terms with any
accuracy, that the stated factors "are all considered in determining
the question, and it is for the triers of fact to determine whether or
not there is a sufficient group of favorable factors to establish the
relationship. ' 77 This weighing process could be made more elaborate by the inclusion of additionalfactors, allowed under the phrase
"the following matters of fact, among others, are considered."78
Thus, the Restatement presented the common law test as a flexible,
ad hoc balancing of factors which each judge or jury was relatively
free to apply or adjust to the facts of each case in its inquiry into the
true nature of the employment relationship.
The time of employment and the method of payment are important. If the time of
employment is short, the worker is less apt to subject himself to control as to the
details and the job is more likely to be considered his job than the job of the one

employing him. This is especially true if payment is made by the job and not by the
hour. If, however, the work is not skilled, or if the employer supplies the
instrumentalities, the workman may be found to be a servant.

Id. (same language retained in comment j of the Restatement (Second)). Therefore, a
worker who is paid by the job, rather than by the hour, may still be an employee. See id.

73. Id. § 220(2)(h).
74. Id. § 220(2)(i).
75. Id § 220 cmt. a (same language retained in comment a of the Restatement

(SEcoND)).
76. Id. § 220 cmt. c (same language retained in comment e of the Restatement
(SECOND)).

77. See RESTATmEIENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY Introduction § 220 cmt. b

(1933) (same language retained in comment c of the Restatement (Second)).
78. Id. § 220(2) (emphasis added).
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For advice on how to interpret the word "employee" in a statutory rather than common law context, comment d to section 220 of
the Restatement presented this cautionary note:
Statutes have been passed in which the words "servant" and
"agent" have been used. The meaning of these words in statutes
varies. The context and purpose of the particularstatute controls
the meaning which is frequently not that79which the same word
bears in the Restatement of this Subject.
Therefore, when interpreting the common law test for employee
under a statute, the purpose of the statute was to be given weight
and, in close cases, to control the definition.80
Overall, these general principles collected by the Restatement
constituted the predominant common law test for determining
independent contractor status at the time the NLRA was enacted.8
Therefore, the Board as a trier of fact applying the common law test
was free to employ this flexible balancing of factors and to consider
whatever additional facts it found would assist its inquiry into the
true nature of the employment relationship in question.
B.

The OriginalMeaning of Employee Under the Wagner Act

The drafters of the Wagner Act expressly intended section 2(3)'s
definition of employee to be read broadly and not necessarily limited to the categories of workers that had been recognized as
employees in other contexts.82 Specifically, the 1935 House report
of the Committee of Labor stated that, with regard to section 2(3),
"[t]he committee wishes to emphasize the need for the recognition
as expressed in subsections 3 [the definition of employee] and 9 [the
definition of labor dispute], that disputes may arise regardless of
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee. 8' 3 Thus, under this expansive design, the drafters
79. Id. § 220 cmt. d (emphasis added). This language, however, was omitted from the
Restatement (Second), which instead advises that "[u]nder the usual Employers' Liability
Acts and the Workmen's Compensation Acts the tests given in this Section for the existence
of the relation of master and servant are valid," but that beyond those laws "there is little
uniformity of decision." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 220 cmt. g.
80. See id. § 220 cmt. d.
81. See id. § 220.
82. See H.R. REP. No. 74-1147, at 10 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT,1935, at 3056-57 (1935).
83. 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

Acr, 1935,

at 3056 (1935) (emphasis added).
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conceived of the possibility that workers who had not been considered "employees" in the traditional, common law sense were not
necessarily barred from coverage under section 2(3) if they were
involved in a labor dispute and in need of the Act's protections.84
Moreover, the drafters intended that the meaning of employee
under section 2(3) was to be applied in a manner that would effectuate the Act's purposes of remedying unequal bargaining power
and encouraging collective bargaining. 5 In support of its decision
that "employee" was to be interpreted broadly, the 1935 House
report quoted from a 1921 United States Supreme Court discussion
remarkably similar to the discussion of economic dependency in
s6
Hearst:
[Labor unions] were organized out of the necessities of the situation. A single employee was helpless in dealing with an
employer. He was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the
maintenance of himself and family. If the employer refused to
pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless
unable to leave the employ and to resist arbitrary and unfair
treatment. Union was essential to give laborers opportunity to
deal on equality with their employer.87
The drafters' reliance upon this passage highlights their intent that
the determination of the meaning of employee under the Act was
to include consideration of the Act's overall purposes of remedying
unequal bargaining power and encouraging collective bargaining so
that workers in need of the Act's protections would be assured
protection.
The intent of the Wagner Act drafters that the meaning of
employee would require some consideration of the NLRA's purposes was not a new idea and in fact followed the contemporary
common law model for interpreting labor statutes. 8 By the time of
the NLRA, it was a well established principle of the courts to inter84. See id. at 3057.
85. See id.
86. See generally id. (quoting American Steel Foundaries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades
Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921)); see infra Part IV.B.4.c. In fact, Hearst cited this Tri-City
language in its rendering of the factors of economic reality. See NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 127 (1944).
87. See H.R. RP. No. 74-1147, at 10 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr, 1935, at 3056-57 (1935) (quoting TriCity, 257 U.S. at 209).
88. See, e.g., Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 552-53 (2d Cir. 1914).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

17

Hofstra
Labor
and Employment
1 [1997],
Hofstra
Labor
& EmploymentLaw
LawJournal,
Journal Vol. 15, Iss.
[Vol.
15:75 Art. 4

pret the language of a labor statute in the context of the statute's
purpose. 89 For example, in 1914, Judge Learned Hand of the Second Circuit described this very principle in the context of interpreting Pennsylvania's workers' compensation law:9°
It is true that the statute uses the word "employed," but it must
be understood with reference to the purpose of the act, and
where all the conditions of the relation require protection, protection ought to be given. It is absurd to class such a [worker] as
an independent contractor in the only sense in which that phrase
is here relevant. He has no capital, no financial responsibility.
He is himself as dependent upon the conditions of his employment as the company fixes them as are his helpers. By him alone
is carried on the company's only business; he is their "hand," if
any one is .... Such statutes ... should be construed, not as
theorems of Euclid, but with some imagination of the purposes
9
which lie behind them. '

This quotation not only illustrates the importance that the statutory
purpose of a labor law had in interpreting the word "employee" at
common law, it also demonstrates that factors of dependency were
being applied by courts deciding independent contractor status
prior to the NLRA.
In sum, the drafters of the Wagner Act, relying upon well established principles of common law, expressly intended that the term
"employee" be read broadly and applied in a manner that would
effectuate the Act's purposes of remedying unequal bargaining
power and encouraging collective bargaining. Thus, the early
Board and the courts were permitted to interpret section 2(3) cov89. See id.
90. See id
91. Id. (emphasis added). The axiom contained in this passage, that "where all the
conditions of the relation require protection, protection ought to be given," id., was the same
principle stated by the Board in Seattle Post-IntelligencerDept. of Hearst Publications,Inc., 9
N.L.R.B. 1262 (1938), when it held that "[t]he declared policy and procedure of the Act
encompasses the needs of such employees" who were in the same relative position as other
workers who were classified as employees. Seattle-Post-Intelligener, 9 N.L.R.B. at 1281
(emphasis added). Or, as the Hearst Court later stated,
when the particular situation of employment combines these characteristics [of
unequal bargaining power] so that the economic facts of the relation make it more
one of employment than of independent business enterprise with respect to the
ends sought to be accomplished by the legislation, those characteristics may
outweigh technical legal classification for purposes unrelated to the statute's
objectives and bring the relation within its protections.
Hearst, 322 U.S. at 127-28.
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erage broadly and look to the purposes of the Act for guidance
when deciding independent contractor status.
IV.

THE BoARD's EARLY INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
DECISIONS

Originally, the Wagner Act92 enacted by Congress in 1935 did not
contain an exclusion for independent contractors under the definition of employee.93 At the time, section 2(3) of the Act provided
that "[t]he term 'employee' shall include any employee," with
explicit exceptions only for agricultural laborers, domestic servants,
and persons hired by a parent or spouse. 94 However, because

independent contractors traditionally had been excluded from the
class of employees at common law,95 the Board excluded independent contractors from NLRA coverage even without an express statutory exclusion.9 6
As this section illustrates, the Board, in its decisions during the

period of time from the Wagner Act of 193597 to the Taft-Hartley
Act of 1947,98 consistently determined the line between employees

and independent contractors by applying the traditional principles
of the common law test as they were rendered by the Restatement.99 However, in those close cases where the Restatement factors expressly listed in section 220(2) did not clearly decide the
status of workers, the Board added to the balance facts relevant to

either the dependence or independence of the worker in relation to
the employer. 100
92. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994).
93. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)(1994).
94. Section 2(3) of the Act, in full, provided:
The term 'employee' shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and
shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice,
and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent
employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural
laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any
individual employed by his parent or spouse ....
Id.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See supra Part III.A.
See infra Parts IV.A. & B.1. & B.2.
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994).
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1994).
See infra Parts IV.A. & B.1. & B.2.
See infra text accompanying notes 123-25, 133-41.
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Additional inquiries that the Board considered which shed light
on the independence of workers included whether the workers had
any real interest in the employment separate from the employer's
interest, and whether the workers could be employed by other companies without the employer's consent. 1 1 With regard to indicia of
dependence, the Board considered such factual questions as
whether the monies received by the worker were analogous to the
wages of an employee, whether the workers were in the same economic position as employees, and whether the workers would benefit from collective bargaining, a condition contrary to the interests
of true independent contractors. 0 2
A.

The First Application: Seattle Post

In its first case interpreting the definition of employee in the
independent contractor context, the Board in Seattle Post-Intelligencer Department of Hearst Publications,Inc.," 3 found that two
disputed classes of workers employed by the Seattle Post were
employees within the meaning of section 2(3) of the Act, despite
10 4
the existence of employment contracts that stated otherwise.
The Board framed its inquiry in the following manner:
As used in the Act the term [employee] embraces "any
employee," that is, all employees in the conventional as well as
legal sense except those by express provision excluded. The primary consideration is whether effectuation of the declared policy
and purposes of the Act comprehends securing to the individual
the rights guaranteed and protection afforded by the Act. The
matter is not conclusively determined by a contract which adverts
to and purports to establish the status of such person other than
as an employee. Public interest in the administration of the Act

101. See infra text accompanying notes 123-25, 133-41.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 123-25, 133-41.
103. 9 N.L.R.B. 1262 (1938).
104. Id. at 1275, 1281; see also Constitution Publ'g Co., 29 N.L.R.B. 105 (1941) (holding
newspaper carriers were employees under § 2(3) of the Act). But see Jalmer Berg, 35
N.L.R.B. 357,360 (1941) (holding truck drivers were not employees under § 2(3) because the

employer did not own the trucks and did not exercise control over the details of the work; the
drivers themselves determined hours worked, number and size of loads they would haul, and

sometimes hauled logs for other timber companies without permission of employer).
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into the material facts and substance of the
permits an inquiry
05
relationship.1
The first occupational group the Board reviewed was a class of

motor route drivers who delivered newspapers by automobile to
subscribers, collected monthly subscription fees, and attempted to
secure new subscribers for the newspaper. 10 6 In holding that the
motor route drivers were employees, the Board noted that they

were employees in the conventional sense because their work was a
functional part of the business, was continuous rather than aimed at

accomplishing specific results, and was subject in large measure to
the control and right of control of the newspaper. 7 Additionally,
the Board regarded the drivers as having no real interest in the

business, which was in fact the property of the newspaper and was
available to the company at any time it wished to terminate a

driver's contract.'08

The second class of disputed workers consisted of outside tele-

phone crew workers who engaged in the solicitation of subscriptions for the newspaper by telephone. 0 9 Finding that these
solicitors were also employees," 0 the Board noted that each worker
was required to report daily to the plant, was furnished a list of
prospective subscribers to contact that day, and was subject to the
105. Seattle Post, 9 N.L.R.B. at 1274-75 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). As
evidence of the declared policy of the NLRA, the Board cited § 1 of the Act which described
the policy as the elimination and mitigation of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce... by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by
workers of the full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
Ld.
at 1274 n.22.
The policy paragraph of § 1, which the Board quoted as evidence of the Act's directives of
encouraging collective bargaining and protecting collective bargaining, remains in force
today without substantive change. See 29 U.S.C. § 1951 (1996). Amendments to § 1, however, have added only a few paragraphs of congressional findings, which constitute statements of factual conditions which motivated Congress to amend the Act at various times.
See id. In other words, the basic prescriptivepolicies of the Act have remained constant
throughout the history of the Act despite the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin amendments. See id.
106. See Seattle Post, 9 N.L.R.B. at 1273.
107. See id. at 1275. The Board found the drivers also to be legally defined as employees
under the applicable state law. See id. (with no citation to Washington law).
108. See id.
109. See id. at 1281.
110. See id.
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same control and discharge as the "inside" telephone solicitors who
worked on the plant's premises and were considered by the newspaper to be employees. 11 ' The Board specifically held that "[t]he
declared policy and procedure of the Act encompass the needs of
'
such employees." 112
In other words, because these workers were in

the same relative position as conventional employees, the Board
therefore required the same guarantees and protections afforded
13
employees under the NLRA. 1
Although the Board stated that its holdings were made partially
upon policy, in substance, it heavily relied upon traditional common
law factors in determining whether these workers were in fact
employees." 4 For example, with respect to the drivers, it reviewed
whether their work was part of the newspaper's regular business," 5
the amount of control the paper exercised over the drivers, 1 6 and
the fact that the performance of the drivers was "not so much the
accomplishment of any specified result as continuing operation in
close association with the entire enterprise .. .I7

Similarly, with

regard to the outside telephone workers, the Board considered the
amount of control exercised by the newspaper," 8 the continuous
nature of the relationship," 9 as well as the fact that the workers
were performing the same tasks as other workers recognized by the
newspaper as employees. 20
After evaluating the common law factor regarding the method of
payment,' 2 ' the Board concluded that "[w]e do not consider the
method by which the drivers are compensated as inconsistent with
111. See Seattle Post, 9 N.L.R.B. at 1281.
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. See id; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TH= LAW OF AGENCY § 220 (1933).
115. See Seattle Post, 9 N.L.R.B. at 1275; REsTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY

§ 220 (2)(h) (1933).
116. See Seattle Post, 9 N.L.R.B. at 1275; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY
§ 220(2)(a) (1933).
117. Seattle Post, 9 N.L.R.B. at 1275; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY

§ 220 cmt. a (1933).
118. See Seattle Post, 9 N.L.R.B. at 1281; RESTATEMENT

(FIRST) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY

§ 220(2)(a) (1933).
119. See Seattle Post, 9 N.L.R.B. at 1281; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY

§ 220(2)(f) (1933).
120. See Seattle Post, 9 N.L.R.B. at 1281; RxSTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY

§ 220(2)(c) (1933).
121. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 220(2)(g) (1933). A worker

who is paid by the job, rather than by the hour, still may have been an employee if the work

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol15/iss1/4

22

1997]

Burdick: Principles of Agency Permit the NLRB to Consider Additional Facto

Determining Independent ContractorStatus Under Section 2(3)

their employee status."'122 The Board explained its conclusion by
stating:
In addition to the weekly allowance for car expense and carriage
of bundles[the drivers] receive the difference between the socalled purchase price and the regular subscription price. Inasmuch as the drivers deal only with newspapers delivered to subscribers their return is analogous to earnings measured by the
number of subscription
deliveries rather than profit from an
12
independent business. 3
In other words, the Board determined that where the publishers
provided subscription lists to the drivers, and had set both the
wholesale and resale prices of the papers, the per-paper method of
payment was more analogous to the setting of a wage than to the
selling of papers to an independent business which could resell the
papers freely and without the restraint of an established subscription list.124 Thus, the Board held that because of the economic reality of the manner used by the publisher to pay the motor route
drivers, this per-paper method of payment was not inconsistent with
dependent employee status.12s
The Board also considered a few inquiries into the independence
of the drivers in the employment relationship in order to determine
whether the entrepreneurial dimension of independent contractor
status was present. 2 6 These additional factors included whether
the drivers had any real interest in the delivery business separate
from the newspaper's enterprise, and whether the drivers could act
as representatives of competing publishers without the company's
consent. 27

was unskilled or if the employer provided the instrumentalities. See id. § 220 cmt. f; see also
supra note 72 and accompanying text.

122. Seattle Post, 9 N.L.R.B. at 1275.
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See Seattle Post, 9 N.L.R.B. at 1275 (finding drivers had no real interest in business
and could not work for other companies without employer consent).
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B.

The Hearst Publications Case

1. Board Decision on the Status of the District Managers
In Hearst Publications,Inc.,'2 8 the Board held that the district
managers of four Los Angeles newspapers were employees within
the meaning of section 2(3).129 Each district manager worked an
assigned geographical area within which he was authorized to distribute his company's newspaper. 30 He picked up the newspapers
for distribution from the publisher's plant, and delivered them to
newsboys who then sold them to the public.' 3 ' The publishers
charged the district managers for each newspaper they took from
the plant. At the end of the selling period, the district managers
received the difference between the wholesale and resale
prices of
32
the paper, both of which were set by the publisher.
In deciding the case, the Board used a mix of common law and
additional economic factors of dependence in making its determination that these distribution agents "occupy positions comparable, in
all substantial respects, to persons indisputably identified as
employees."' 33 For instance, referring to common law inquiries, the
Board noted the continuous nature of the employment relationship
in which the managers worked regular hours each day for an indefinite term,13 4 and that the managers provided the publishers with a
function essential to the newspaper business.' 35 Moreover, the
Board found indicia of control in the methods used by the publishers to check the work of the district managers and to direct 36the
managers in the correction of faults found in their territories.
The only fact regarding the managers' lack of independence that
the Board added to the balance was that the publishers prohibited
the managers from selling other newspapers. 37 The only economic
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

25 N.L.R.B. 621 (1940).
See id. at 630.
See id.
at 626.
See i
See id.
Hearst, 25 N.L.R.B. at 629.
See id.;
RESTATEmENT (FIRST)OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 220(2)(f) & cmt. a (1933).
See Hearst, 25 N.L.R.B. at 629 n.20 (quoting Seattle Post, 9 N.L.R.B. 1262);

REsTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF TE LAW OF AGENCY § 220(2)(b) (1933).
136. See Hearst, 25 N.L.R.B. at 629; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY
§ 220(2)(a) (1933).
137. See Hearst, 25 N.L.R.B. at 629; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY

§ 220(2)(a)(1933).
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facts of dependency reviewed by the Board were those concerning
the method of payment. 3 ' There, the Board found the wages of
the district managers were controlled by the publishers because the
publishers regulated both the quantity of papers the managers
could purchase for distribution, as well as the purchase and resale
prices of the papers. 139 The Board found these economic facts to be
evidence of a form of payment similar to the regular wages received
by an employee, rather than the profit gained by a business. 4 °

Thus, the Board found these managers to have the characteristics of
employees, rather than independent contractors.' 4 '
2. Board Decision on the Status of the Newsboys
1 42
In the consolidated case of Stockholders Publishing Co.,
involving the same four newspaper businesses in Los Angeles, the
Board held that a certain class of newsboys were employees within
the meaning of section 2(3). 141 "Newsboy" was an occupational
term of art for positions held by adult men who sold newspapers to
customers on the streets.144 The appropriate unit at issue in Stockholders were specific groups of newsboys who sold "fU-time at
established spots," and worked "on a regular basis, often for a numbers of years, [forming] a stable group with relatively little turnover."'145 This group was in contrast to regular schoolboys and others
who sold newspapers as temporary and causal distributors, and
thus, clearly were not employees.' 4 6 The Los Angeles publishers
refused to bargain with these newsboys claiming they were
independent contractors over whom the papers exercised only that
amount of incidental control usually associated with conditions

placed upon any buyer of a commodity.14 7

138. See Hearst, 25 N.L.R.B. at 629; RESTATEmNT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY

§ 220(2)(g) (1933).
139. See Hearst, 25 N.L.R.B. at 629.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 629-30.
142. 28 N.L.R.B. 1006 (1941).
143. See id. at 1022-24.
144. See Hearst Publications, Inc. v. NLRB, 136 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1943), rev'd, 322
U.s. Ill (1944).
145. Stockholders, 28 N.L.R.B. at 1024-26.

146. See id.
147. See id. at 1023.
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Once again, the Board applied common law factors as its central
analysis. For instance, the Board considered the extent to which
the companies exercised control over the details of the newsboys'
work, 14 8 and found there was sufficient control to grant employee
status based on the facts that the newspapers "supervise the newsboys' selling activities as to such details of performance as the manner of calling, holding, and displaying the newspaper, and place of
its sale within the allotted territory."' 4 9 The Board also found indicia of control where the publishers were able to "at will discharge
the newsboys, transfer them to other locations, and lay them off as
disciplinary measures," and because the papers required "the newsboys' attendance at their posts . . . during relatively definite

hours." 50 The publishers also were found to have provided the
newsboys with a place to work and supplied the instrumentalities of
work, 5' because "the Companies hire the newsboys by the allotment of comers and spots, thus providing them with a place to
work, [and] furnish[ing] company-owned equipment and parapher52
nalia to facilitate newspaper sales.'
The Board also found the newsboys were employees because
they were hired for an indefinite period,'15 and were "an integral
part of the Companies' distribution system and circulation organization.""' When assessing the common law factor of method of
payment, 55 the Board found that even though the news vendors
were "charged" for the number of papers they received and then
later reconciled accounts with the district manager, this method of
payment was merely "a convenient accounting device employed by
the Companies to measure the earnings of the newsboys.' 56
Thus, the Board's analysis of the status of this certain class of
newsboys under section 2(3) as conventional employees considered
factors from the common law test outlined by the Restatement. 57
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See id. at 1023; REsTATEmENT (FIrST) OF TH LAW OF AGENCY § 220(2)(a) (1933).
Stockholders, 28 N.L.R.B. at 1023.
Id.
See id.; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 220(2)(e) (1933).
Stockholders, 28 N.L.R.B. at 1023.
Id.; RESTATEmENT (FIRST) OF = LAW OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. a (1933).

154. Stockholders, 28 N.L.R.B. at 1023; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY

§ 220(h) (1933).
155. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 220(2)(g) (1933).
156. Stockholders, 28 N.L.R.B. at 1023.
157. See id.at 1023-24; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF

=rELAW OF AGENCY § 220 (1933).
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To these factors, the Board added, in terms similar to Seattle Post,
that the newsboys had "no vested interest in the newspaper business" that one might expect from entrepreneurs. 58 With regard to
whether the newsboys were employees as a matter of law, the companies argued that California case law defined newsboys as
independent contractors for the purposes of tort liability and workers' compensation, and that this definition decided the issue under
the NLRA. 59 The Board, however, rejected this argument, stating
"[w]e do not herein pass upon the nature of the relationship for
other purposes, but hold upon this record that the newsboys here
involved are within the definition of employees as the term is used
160
in this Act.'

In essence, the Board asserted that it had the authority to interpret de novo the question of which workers were employees under
the Act, rather than simply import the legal definitions and specific
holdings from the case law of the local state in which the labor dispute arose.16' The Board instead applied the general principles of
the common law, which, from the structure of its analysis, appear to
62
be substantially similar to the Restatement.1
As the Board established in Seattle Post, the words "any
employee" in section 2(3) were to be interpreted broadly and
embraced "all employees in the conventional as well as legal sense
'
except those by express provision excluded."163
In interpreting section 2(3)'s definition of employee, the Board's primary consideration was "whether effectuation of the declared policy and purposes
of the Act comprehends securing to the individual the rights guaranteed and protection afforded by the Act."'"
In sum, the Board's early rendering of a test for the definition of
employee in the independent contractor context involved a consideration of the general principles of common law as referenced by
the Restatement. The intent was to achieve the declared purposes
of section 1 of the Act, which the Board interpreted as meaning
that workers who had substantially similar needs for the guarantees
158.
159.
160.
161.

See Stockholders, 28 N.L.R.B. at 1023-24.
See id. at 1024.
Id.
See id.

162. See id at 1023-24; RESTATErmT (FIRS-r) OF THE LAw OF AGENcY § 220 (1933).
163. Seattle Post, 9 N.L.R.B. 1262, 1274 (1938).
164. Id. at 1274-75.
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and protections of the NLRA would be assured coverage. 165 Given
the intent of the drafters of the Wagner Act, that "employee" was
to be read broadly and with some consideration of the purposes of
the Act,' 6 6 the early Board in the years 1935 to 1944 properly
applied the principles of agency in the statutory context of the
NLRA.
3. The Ninth Circuit Opinion.
The newspaper businesses who had been ordered by the Board 16to7
bargain with their street vendors in Stockholders Publishing Co.
petitioned the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for review, again
168
claiming that the newspaper vendors were not their employees.
Specifically, the companies argued that because the Act did not
conitain a precise definition of employee, "Congress intended to use
the words in their ordinary and conventional sense as understood at
the time the statute was enacted."'1 69 Counsel for the NLRB, in
contrast, argued that Congress contemplated a class of potential
employees larger than found under the common law, stating "where
the persons involved function in a realistic economic sense as
employees of an industrial enterprise Congress intended them to be
170
within the Act.'
As authority, NLRB Counsel relied upon Seattle Post's discussion
of employee as including "all employees in the conventional as well
as legal sense except those by express provision excluded," with the
primary inquiry being "whether effectuation of the declared policy
and purposes of the Act comprehends securing to the individual the
rights guaranteed and protection afforded the Act."'' The court,
however, rejected the Board's interpretation stating that under the
NLRA:
[T]here is no delegation to an administrative body of power to
determine whether the facts are within a specified exception to a
statute, the exercise of which power involves an interpretation of
terms. Rather does the instant case fall within the general rule
165. See supra Part IV.A. & B.1
166. See supra Part III.B.

167. 28 N.L.R.B. 1006 (1941).
168. See Hearst Publications, Inc. v. NLRB, 136 F.2d 608, 611 (9th Cir. 1943), rev'd, 322
U.s. 111 (1944).
169. Id. at 611-12.
170. Id. at 612 (quoting the Board's Brief for Enforcement).

171. Seattle Post, 9 N.L.R.B. at 1274-75.
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that "the interpretation of the meaning of statutes, as applied
to
172
justiciable controversies, is exclusively a judicial function.,
With this analysis, the court dissolved the usual deference accorded
to an administrative agency absent a finding that its interpretation
was arbitrary, and proceeded to interpret for itself the meaning of
employee under the Act. 73

The Ninth Circuit agreed with the newspapers and held that the
definition of employee under section 2(3) was to be given its conventional, common law meaning. 7 4 Relying upon a California case
that held newsboys to be independent contractors under California's statutory definition of employee, 175 the court found the case
law persuasive on the common law meaning of employee, and
decided that the NLRA was intended to import specific state common law standards by occupation, as it held that the newsboys were
176
employees.
4. The United States Supreme Court Opinion
On appeal from the Ninth Circuit, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari in NLRB v. Hearst Publications,Inc. 17 7 to
resolve the question of whether the newsboys were employees
within the meaning of section 2(3)Y.17 Reversing the Ninth Circuit,
the Court found that Congress did not intend to import specific variations of state common law into the NLRA definition of
employee, 79 that the Board was allowed to consider facts involving
172. Hearst,136 F.2d at 612 (quoting United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc.,
310 U.S. 534, 544 (1940)).
173. See id. The dissent addressed this point stating "we are not free to draw our own
inferences, and the sole question before us is whether the Board reasonably could infer from
the varied incidents of the relationship between the men and the publishers that it is one of

employer and employee." Id. at 614 (Denman, J.,
dissenting).
174. See Hearst Publications, Inc. v. NLRB, 136 F.2d 608, 612 (9th Cir. 1943), rev'd, 322
U.S. iii (1944).
175. See id. at 613 (citing New York Indem. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 1 P.2d 12

(Cal. 1931) (tort liability of employer); State Compensation Fund v. Indus. Accident
Comm'n, 14 P.2d 306 (Cal. 1932) (workers' compensation)). The California statutory
definition interpreted by the cited cases provided: "A servant is one who is employed to

render personal service to his employer, other than in the pursuit of an independent calling,
and who in such service remains entirely under the control and direction of the employer,

who is called his master." Id. at 613 n.3 (citing CAL. LAn. CODE § 3000, St. 1937, 261).
176. See Hearst,136 F.2d at 613.

177. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
178. See id.at 113 & n.1.

179. See id.at 120-24.
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the economic reality of the relationship between worker and
employer based upon the special purposes of the NLRA, 80 and
that the Board's determinations were to be accepted by the courts
as long as its findings were warranted on the factual record and
based reasonably in law. 8 '
a. The State Law Issue
The Ninth Circuit had decided that the NLRA was intended to
import specific state common law standards by occupation. 182 The
Supreme Court rejected this notion and held that those state stan183
dards "unrelated to the Wagner Act's purposes and provisions"'
should not be automatically imported as a matter of law into the
Act's definition of employee: 184
The argument assumes that there is some simple, uniform and
easily applicable test which the courts have used, in dealing with
such problems, to determine whether persons doing work for
others fall in one class or the other. Unfortunately this is not
true. Only by a long and tortuous history was the simple formulation worked out which has been stated most frequently as "the
test" for deciding whether one who hires another is responsible
in tort for his wrongdoing. [citing the REsTATEMENT OF THE
LAW OF AGENCY § 220.] But this formula has been by no means
exclusively controlling in the solution of other problems.... Few
problems in law have given greater variety of application and
conflict in results than the cases arising in the borderland
between what is clearly an employer-employee relationship and
85
what is clearly one of independent, entrepreneurial dealing.
Illustrating this variation, the Court discussed the different results
reached within the same jurisdiction where a single person was
"held to be an 'independent contractor' for purposes of imposing
vicarious liability in tort,"' 6 but found to be an employee for pur180. See id. at 128-29.
181. See id. at 130-32.
182. See Hearst Publications, Inc. v. NLRB, 136 F.2d 608, 613 (9th Cir. 1943), rev'd, 322
U.S. 111 (1944).
183. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 120 (1944).
184. See id. at 120-23.
185. Id. at 120-21 (footnotes omitted).
186. Id. at 122.
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poses of unemployment compensation. 187 The Court viewed this
variation as a function of the different purposes of the two laws.' 88
Rather than give effect to varying local statutory or judicial conceptions, the Wagner Act, the Court stated, "is federal legislation,
administered by a national agency, intended to solve a national
problem on a national scale."' 8 9 Thus, the Court held, because

Congress intended the NLRA to apply uniformly throughout the
nation, the federal interpretation of the relationship under the
NLRA was to prevail no matter what status the worker was given
under state law.190
b. The Issue of Deference to the Board
The Ninth Circuit had held that the usual deference accorded to
the findings of an administrative agency did not apply to determinations of the Board because it found that Congress had not expressly
delegated to the Board the judicial power of interpreting the statutory terms of the NLRA.' 91 The Supreme Court, however,
reversed that holding, finding instead that the task of defining
employee "has been assigned primarily to the agency created by
Congress to administer the Act."' 192 In addition to the congressional delegation, the Court noted that the Board also had the mandate of special insight to make such interpretations:
Everyday experience in the administration of the statute gives

[the Board] familiarity with the circumstances and backgrounds
of employment relationships in various industries, with the abilities and needs of the workers for self-organization and collective
action, and with the adaptability of collective bargaining for93the
peaceful settlement of their disputes with their employers.'
187. See id. at 122 (citing Globe Grain & Milling Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 P.2d 512
(Utah 1939) (holding that the statutory purpose of making an employer prove all three
elements of the exclusion under state unemployment statute for independent contractors was

to ensure that workers who were employees in reality would not lose protection because they
were labelled independent contractors in form)).

188. See Hearst,322 U.S. at 122.
189. Id. at 123.
190. See id. at 123-24.
191. See Hearst Publications, Inc. v. NLRB, 136 F.2d 608, 612 (9th Cir. 1943), rev'd, 322

U.S. 111 (1944).

192. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944).

193. Id. at 130.
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As a result, the Court found it was improper for the Ninth Circuit
to have substituted its own inferences of fact where the Board's
findings were warranted on the factual record and based reasonably
94

in law.1

c.

Factors of Economic Dependency

When determining the question of whether workers were
employees under the NLRA, the Court concluded that the purposes of the Act allowed inquiry into the economic facts of the
employment relationship. 95 Citing section 1 of the Act, the Court
stated that the interrelated purposes of the NLRA were "to
encourage collective bargaining and to remedy the individual
worker's inequality of bargaining power."' 9 6 The Court explained
that:
Inequality of bargaining power in controversies over wages,
hours and working conditions may as well characterize the status
of [independent contractors] as of [employees]. The former,
when acting alone, may be as "helpless in dealing with an
employer," as "dependent ...on his daily wage" and as "unable
to leave the employ and to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment"
as the latter. For each, "union . . . [may be] essential 197
to
give ...opportunity to deal on equality with their employer."'
In other words, "[w]here all the conditions of the relation require
protection, protection ought to be given."' 19 The Court summarized the relevant economic facts as follows:
In short, when the particular situation of employment combines
these characteristics [of unequal bargaining power], so that the
economic facts of the relation make it more nearly one of
employment than of independent business enterprise with
respect to the ends sought to be accomplished by the legislation,
194. See id. at 130-32.
195. See id. at 126-28.
196. Id. at 126.
197. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 127 (quoting American Steel Foundaries Co. v. "fii-City Cent.
Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921)) (cited in H.R. REP. No. 74-1147, at 10 (1935),
reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATrVE IsTORY OF THE NATnONAL LABOR RELATIONS Actr,

1935, at 3056-57 (1935)) ("[t]he committee wishes to emphasize the need for the recognition
as expressed in subsections 3 [the definition of employee] and 9 [the term labor dispute], that
disputes may arise regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
employer and employee .... ).

198. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 129 (quoting Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547,
552 (2d Cir. 1914)).
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those characteristics may outweigh technical legal classification

for purposes unrelated to the 1statute's
objectives and bring the
99
relation within its protections.

The Court grounded this view upon the legislative history, demon-

strating that Congress intended the definitions of the Act to be read
broadly and anticipated that the Act at times would cover workers

who might not be considered employees for the purposes of other
statutes.200 Thus, in the borderland between what is clearly an

employer-employee relationship and what is clearly one of
independent entrepreneurial dealing, the Court found the determination was to be made broadly by assessing the "underlying economic facts rather than technically and exclusively by previously
established legal classifications."2 "1
Applying the test to the California newsboys, the Court found

them to be exposed, "as a matter of economic fact, to the evils that
statute was designed to eradicate," and therefore found it was

appropriate to provide them protection as employees under the
Act.20 2 For the particular facts of this dependence, the Court cited
the findings developed by the Board.20 3 Specifically, the Court
noted that:
[T]he designated newsboys... rely upon their earnings for the

support of themselves and their families, and have their total
wages influenced in large measure by the publishers, who dictate

199. Id. at 127-28.
200. See id. at 128 (citing S.REP.No. 74-573, 7 (1935)).
201. Id. at 129. But see NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254,256 (1968) (characterizing
the sole standard used in Hearst as "one of economic and policy considerations within the
labor field.") In fact, as the text in Hearstnotes, these policy concerns came into play only in
the very close cases in which the common law principles of agency failed to direct a clear
answer:

Myriad forms of service relationship, with infinite and subtle variations in the terms
of employment, blanket the nation's economy. Some are within this Act, others
beyond its coverage. Large numbers will fall clearly on one side or on the
other ....But intermediate there will be many, the incidents of whose employment
partake in part of one group, in part of the other, in varying proportions of weight.
And consequently the legal pendulum . . . may swing one way or the other
depending upon the weight of this balance and its relation to the special purpose at
hand.
Hearst,322 U.S. at 126-27.
202. I& at 127.
203. See id. at 131.
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their buying and selling prices, fix their markets and control their
204
supply of papers.

The Court also noted evidence of the traditional common law factors of control, such as the continuous nature of the employment,
and the provision of instrumentalities and tools, which pointed
toward an inference of employee status.20 5
In sum, the doctrine of economic dependency was to be applied
only in that borderland of cases where the line between employee
and independent contractor was unclear. 0 6 Where the line was distinct, the general principles of the common law of agency, as rendered in the Restatement, were sufficient for the analysis.20 7 In
other words, the economic test did not displace the common law
test, but was instead a set of additional inquiries to be used in very
close cases.208 In those close cases, the Act's purposes of encouraging collective bargaining, and in particular, remedying the individual worker's inequality of bargaining power, were to be given
weight.20 9 What was to be avoided was the mechanical application

of technical standards developed under statutes unrelated in purpose to the NLRA, the result of which would render holdings
inconsistent with the Act.210
204. Id.
205. See id. (stating the vendors "hours of work and their efforts on the job are
supervised and to some extent prescribed by the publishers or their agents," that they "work
continuously and regularly," and that the publishers furnished "sales equipment and
advertising materials" from which the newspapers would benefit).
206. The Supreme Court's enunciation and explanation of the "test" was far more
expansive than the Board's explanation, which presented the economic inquiries as little
more than additional factors for consideration. The Board did not consider these additional
factors to be part of a test separate from the principles of common law agency. See supra text
accompanying notes 132-40.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 132-40.
208. See Hearst,322 U.S. at 129.
209. See id. at 126.
210. But see United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713-14 (1947) (holding that the
application of the Social Security Act "should follow the same rule that we applied to the
National Labor Relations Act in the Hearst case"). The Silk Court explained the Hearst
opinion in the following abbreviated manner:
The word "employee," we said, was not there used as a word of art, and its content
in its context was a federal problem to be construed "'in the light of the mischief to
be corrected and the end to be attained."' We concluded that, since that end was
the elimination of labor disputes and industrial strife, "employees" included
workers who were such as a matter of economic reality. The aim of the Act was to
remedy the inequality of bargaining power in controversies over wages, hours and
working conditions. We rejected the test of the "'technical concepts pertinent to an
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The aim of these economic inquiries was to determine whether
the workers were economically dependent in a manner similar to
the financial dependence most employees have upon an
employer.2 1 ' Specifically, the general categories of economic facts

discussed by the Hearst Court that indicated the existence of unequal bargaining power in disputes over wages, hours and working

conditions, were facts tending to establish (1) helplessness in dealing with an employer, (2) dependence upon wages from the

employer, (3) an inability to leave the employment relationship
without severe economic consequences, (4) an incapacity to resist
employer's legal responsibility to third persons for acts of his servants."' This is
often referred to as power of control, whether exercised or not, over the manner of
performing service to the industry. Restatement of the Law, Agency, § 220. We
approved the statement of the National Labor Relations Board that "'the primary
consideration in the determination of the applicability of the statutory definition is
whether effectuation of the declared policy and purposes of the Act comprehend
securing to the individual the rights guaranteed and protection afforded by the
Act."'
Silk, 331 U.S. at 713.
The accuracy of this rendering of Hearst, however, is misleading because in summarizing
Hearst, the Silk Court disregarded the Hearst Court's acceptance of the Board's findings of
fact that utilized the common law factors listed in § 220 of the Restatement, such as the
continuous nature of the employment, the provision of instrumentalities and tools, and the
indicia of control the newspapers exercised over the newsboys. See Hearst,322 U.S. at 131.
The Silk Court overlooked the complexity of the Hearst Court's analysis and improperly
presented it as merely a choice between the common law test or the inquiry into the declared
policy and purposes of the statute. In fact, the HearstCourt intended that the usual principles of agency be used to assess the work relationship, but where these principles failed to be
useful in close cases, and possibly could lead to a determination of status on mere technicalities, then facts indicating the economic reality of the relationship were to be assessed so that
the outcome would be consistent with the purposes of the Act. See supra notes 201-209 and
accompanying text.
In fact, in subsequent Social Security Act cases, the Court adopted a "hybrid approach"
which utilized both the statutory purposes inquiry and common law rules. See Matthew J.
Rita, Note, Fishing for Dollars: The IRS Changes Course in Classifying Fishermen for
Employment Tax Purposes,77 CORNELL L. REv. 393, 402-03 (1992).
One year after Silk upheld the use of the statutory purpose inquiry in determining
independent contractor status under the Social Security Act, Congress passed a joint resolution amending the law to include an express exemption for independent contractors by
excluding: "(1) any individual who, under the usual common-law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship, has the status of an independent contractor or
(2) any individual (except an officer of a corporation) who is not an employee under such
common-law rules." See STATus Quo RESOLuTION OF 1948, H.RJ. Res. 296, 80th Cong. § 2,
62 Stat. 438 (1948)(emphasis added). The joint resolution also amended the Internal Revenue Code with an identical exclusion. See id.
211. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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arbitrary and unfair treatment,
and (5) the potential to benefit from
212
collective bargaining.
V.

Tim INTENT OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY AMENDMENT OF
SECTION 2(3)

Three years after the Hearst Court upheld the use of economic
dependency factors, Congress generated a proposed amendment to
section 2(3) which was enacted under the Taft-Hartley Act of
1947.213 In congressional comment, House members attacked the

Hearst opinion claiming that the Court improperly allowed the
Board to ignore "the ordinary tests of the law of agency. '214 Today,
for those current commentators and practitioners who wish to
revive the factors of economic reality set out in Hearst,21 5 the primary hurdle to be cleared is the 1947 legislative record that explic216
itly condemned Hearst.
Therefore, in order to analyze the viability of such a doctrinal
revival or other modification, this section reviews the record of the
Taft-Hartley amendment with an eye to the questions of what
exactly the House critics opposed in Hearst, which holdings of
Hearst were overruled by the Taft-Hartley amendment, and
whether the early Board law on the meaning of section 2(3) prior to
Hearst could be viewed as having survived the 1947 amendment.
The total congressional record on the intended purpose of amending section 2(3) to exempt all workers of independent contractor
status is contained in two documents, the original House report
from the Committee on Education and Labor,2 17 and a second
House report summarizing the agreements of the Conference Committee that were enacted into law.218

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

See Hearst,322 U.S. at 127.
29 U.S.C. § 152(3)(1994).
See H.R. RaP. No. 80-510, at 135 (1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.S. at 1135, 1138.
See supra Part II.C.
See H.R. RE No. 80-510, at 1138.
See H.R. RaP. No. 80-245, at 18 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LErIsLxArv HISTORY
OF ThE LABOR MANAGEmENT RELATiONS Acr, 1947, at 292, 309 (1948); see also infra Part
V.A. (discussing the House Committee Report).
218. See H.R. RaP. No. 80-510, at 1138.
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The House Committee Report

On April 11, 1947, Chairman Hartley of the House Committee
on Education and Labor submitted the committee's report on the
proposed amendments to the National Labor Relations Act of
1935.219 With regard to the proposal to exempt independent contractors from the definition of employee under section 2(3), the
report introduced the discussion with the following statement:
An "employee," according to all standard dictionaries, according
to the law as the courts have stated it, and according to the
understanding of almost everyone, with the exception of members of the National Labor Relations Board, means someone
who works for another for hire. But in the case of National
Labor Relations Board v. HearstPublications,Inc. (322 U.S. 111
(1944)), the Board expanded the definition of the term
"employee" beyond anything that it ever had included before,
and the Supreme Court, relying upon the theoretic "expertness"
of the Board, upheld the Board. 220
On its face, this introduction appears to be moving toward an outright overruling of the Hearst Court's affirmation of the Board's
determination that the newsboys were employees covered by the
Act. 221

However, as the comment continues, it becomes evident that the
House criticism was directed not at the status of the newsboys, but
instead at the relationship between the newspaper publishing companies and22those persons that Hearst had referred to as district
managers:

2

219. H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 292. The stated purposes of the bill, H.R. 3020, were
to prescribe fair and equitable rules of conduct to be observed by labor and
management in their relations with one another which affect commerce, to protect
the rights of individual workers in their relations with labor organizations whose
activities affect commerce, to recognize the paramount public interest in labor
disputes affecting commerce that endanger the public health, safety, or welfare, and
for other purposes.
Id.
For a good summary of the pressures leading to the 1947 amendments, as well as the Taft-

Hartley Act's principle changes to the NLRA, see generally 1 PATRICK HARDIN, Tim
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 35-48 (3d ed. 1992). For a more thorough account, see HARRY A.
& EMILY CLARK BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER Acr To TAFT-HARTLEY: A STUDY OF
NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND LABOR RELATIONS (1950).
MILLIs

220. H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 309.
221. See id.

222. See supra Part IV.A. & B.1. & B.2.
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In this case the Board held independent merchants who bought
newspapers from the publisher and hired people to sell them to
be "employees." The people the merchants hired to sell the
papers were "employees" of the merchants, but holding the
merchants to be "employees"
of the publisher of the papers was
2 23

most far reaching.

These "independent merchants" referred to by the House comment
were in fact the "district managers" referenced in the Board decision, the Ninth Circuit opinion, and the United States Supreme
Court opinion. This is evident from the role of the district managers as described in Stockholders Publishing Co.,2 24 the Board decision below:
Each district manager works in an assigned geographical area,
varying in mileage, within which he is authorized to distribute the
newspaper published by his company.... Each district manager
obtains newspapers for purposes of distribution at the publisher's
plant, travels throughout his district and delivers the newspapers ....

to newsboys, who sell them to the public ....

The

publisher makes a charge against the district manager for each
newspaper that he takes from the plant. Likewise the district
manager enters a charge, which is set by the publisher, against
the newsboy .... 225

The district managers also hired the newsboys. 22 6 The details of
this holding on the status of the district managers were readily
available to the House members since the Hearst Court referenced
them in its opinion. 227
From these facts, it is apparent that the criticism set out in the
House comment with regard to "independent merchants" was
directed at the district managers rather than the newsboys: the dis223. H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 309. This portion of the House report is typically omitted
by commentators quoting the committee's criticism of Hearst. See, e.g., HARDIN, supra note
219, at 1623-24. This is probably due to its inconsistency with the generally accepted notion
that the committee was addressing the status of the newsboys.
224. 28 N.L.R.B. 1006 (1941).
225. Id. at 1013; see also Hearst Publications, Inc. v. NLRB, 136 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir.
1943), rev'd, 322 U.S. 111 (1944) (citing same facts).
226. See Stockholders, 28 N.L.R.B. at 1023; cf. Hearst, 136 F.2d at 611 ("The newsboy
customarily obtains his cormer by applying at the plant of the publisher where he consults the
district manager, who allocates the street comers in his district."). But see NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 119 n.17 (1944) (referring to the companies' argument that
newsboys were independent contractors in part because they sometimes hired assistants).
227. See Hearst,322 U.S. at 118 n.15.
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trict managers were the persons purchasing papers from the publishers and directly hiring the newsboys to sell papers on particular
street comers, and the newsboys were the persons selling the
papers to the public.2 2 Thus, the House comment did not dispute
that the newsboys were employees under section 2(3), but believed
them to be employees of the district managers, rather than the
newspapers. 229
The House comment then continued its assessment of the Hearst
opinion, stating:
In the law, there always has been a difference, and a big difference, between "employees" and "independent contractors."
"Employees" work for wages or salaries under direct supervision.
"Independent contractors" undertake to do a job for a price,
decide how the work will be done, usually hire others to do the
work, and depend for their income not upon wages, but upon the
difference between what they pay for goods, materials, and labor
and what they receive for the end result, that is, upon profits.2 0
In this section of commentary, the House merely recites a few of
the general principles of the common law of agency, albeit in such
an oversimplified manner as to be misleading.3 Logically, this
short rendering of the common law test mentioning only the factors
regarding method of pay and the hiring of others, was most likely
meant as a summary of just those facts the House members considered offensive in the Board's finding that the district managers were
employees: that they hired newsboys, and that their income was
from profits.
Further, only persons entirely unfamiliar with the history and
scope of the problems associated with defining the line between
independent contractors and employees under various state and
federal statutes could possibly describe the difference between
these two statuses as "big." 2 Ironically, such a rhetorical rendering illustrates the common error discussed by the Hearst Court: the
incorrect assumption that there is some simple, uniform, and easily

228. See H.R. REP.No. 80-245, at 309.
229. See id.
230. Id.
231. See supra Part III.A.

232. See H.R. RPp. No. 80-245, at 309.
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applicable test. 33 As one commentator of the period described the
complexity of applying the common law factors:
There are literally thousands of decisions issued by American
and English courts revealing an infinite number of varying and
inconsistent applications of the tests designed to determine
whether or not an individual is an employee. There have been
few legislative concepts
which have been applied more varyingly
2 4
or inconsistently. 3

Thus, the House members who attacked the Hearst decision as
being adverse to the principles of agency and simultaneously
instructed the Board to return to the simple business of applying
the large distinctions between independent contractors and employees, appear to have had very little understanding of the subject they
were attempting to legislate.
The House comment on amending the definition of employee
under section 2(3) concluded with the following passage:
It is inconceivable that Congress, when it passed the act, authorized the Board to give to every word in the act whatever meaning
it wished. On the contrary, Congress intended then, and it
intends now, that the Board give to words not far-fetched meanings but ordinary meanings. To correct what the Board has done,
and what the Supreme Court, putting misplaced reliance upon
the Board's expertness, has approved, the bill excludes
235
"independent contractors" from the definition of "employee."
It is remarkable that the committee assumed the intent of the 1935
drafters, rather than directly citing the language of the 1935 congressional record. Instead of finding it "inconceivable," the House
committee would have found a specific reference supporting the
intent to give the definition of employee under section 2(3) a
broader meaning than found in other contexts, and that the drafters
founded this intent upon well established precepts of the preNLRA common law. 236 Therefore, these were not in fact new, "farfetched" principles that the Board had thought up on its own.
The final passage from the 1947 House report stated that the purpose of expressly exempting independent contractors from NLRA
233. See Hearst,322 U.S. at 120-21.
234. Joseph M. Jacobs, Are "Independent Contractors"Really Independent?, 3 DEPAUL
L. REv.23, 27 (1953).
235. H.R. REp. No. 80-245, at 309.

236. See supra Part III.B.
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coverage was "[t]o correct what the Board has done. ' z1 7 The narrowest interpretation of the meaning of the House comment's discussion of Hearst resides in the realm between these two ideas
expressed in the House comment: its rejection of the holding that
district managers were employees as "most far reaching,""5 8 and its
simple statement that the paper sellers (or newsboys) were employees. 39 In other words, a close scrutiny of the Board's analysis with
regard to the district managers should illuminate exactly which definitional factors the House found offensive to the principles of
agency. 240
In Hearst Publications,Inc.,241 the Board held that the district
managers of four Los Angeles newspapers were employees within
the meaning of section 2(3).242 The Restatement factors used by
the Board included the continuous nature of the employment relationship, 243 the indispensable function of the position to the business of the publishers, 2' and various indicia of control.245 Given
that these were "ordinary" factors at common law, there is little
likelihood that the 1947 House committee members intended to
overrule this portion of the Board's analysis.246 The only economic
facts reviewed by the Board concerned the method of payment factor.2 47 Analogizing to traditional wages, the Board had found that
the publishers controlled the income of district managers by regulating the quantity of papers a manager could purchase, as well as
237. H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 309.

In fact, in the years before the Taft-Hartley

amendment, the Board had not "done something wrong." In centering its § 2(3) inquiry
upon the principles of agency and supplementing those principles with facts relevant to the
purposes and policies of the NLRA, the Board correctly applied the proper formula of the
time. See supra Parts III. & IV. This point of vindication, however, is only of historical

significance.
238. See H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 309.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. 25 N.L.R.B. 621 (1940).

242. See supra Part IV.B.1. This holding was summarized by the Supreme Court. See
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 118 n.15 (1944).
243. See Hearst, 25 N.L.R.B. at 629; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAw OF AGENCY

§ 220(2)(f) & cmt. a (1933).
244. See Hearst, 25 N.L.R.B. at 629; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAw OF AGENCY

§ 220(2)(b) (1933).
245. See Hearst, 25 N.L.R.B. at 629; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAw OF AGENCY

§ 220(2)(a) (1933).
246. See H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 18 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATrVE HISTORY
OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 292, 309 (1948).
247. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAw OF AGENCY § 220(2)(g) & cmt. f (1933).
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the purchase and resale prices of the papers. 248 This was the analysis most likely offensive to the House Committee, particularly since
the House comment insisted that independent contractors "depend
for their income not on wages, but upon the difference between
what they pay for goods . .. and what they receive for the end

result, that is, upon profits."249 The narrowest interpretation of the
House committee's criticism of Hearst, therefore, is that it disagreed with the Board's use of the inquiry into whether income was
not in reality a structure of wages rather than profits -5 0
A second interpretation of the House comment is that it meant to
address the Board's analysis with regard to both the district managers and newsboys. An inquiry into which economic facts the Board
considered in the balance of factors determining the newsboys' status in Stockholders Publishing Co. 5 ' reveals only such a discussion
with regard to the assessment of the common law factor of method
of payment. 52 There, the Board found that even though the news
vendors were "charged" for the number of papers they received
and later reconciled accounts with the district manager each week,
this method of payment was merely "a convenient accounting
device employed by the Companies to measure the earnings of the
newsboys," which in economic reality the Board considered to be
wages.253 This is the same analysis that the House comment was
likely to have found offensive in the Board's analysis of the income
of the district managers?5 4 Thus, the meaning of the House com248. See Hearst, 25 N.L.R.B. at 629.
249. H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 309.

250. The Board accepted this criticism and in the years immediately following the TaftHartley amendment, applied the "profit test" under which it found workers whose income
was from profit to be independent contractors. See 1 PATRICK HARDIN, THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW 35-48 (3rd ed. 1992) at 1624. This reliance upon the House report for specific
interpretative guidance, however, was misplaced given the fact that the Conference
Committee omitted this language from its final compromise. See infra Part V.B.
This narrow interpretation of the.House report would leave intact the Hearst categories of

economic facts implicating unequal bargaining power, that is, (1) helplessness in dealing with
an employer, (2) dependence upon wages from the employer, (3) an inability to leave the
employment relationship without severe economic consequences, (4) an incapacity to resist
arbitrary and unfair treatment, and (5) the potential to benefit from collective bargaining.
See supra Part IV.B.4.c.

251. 28 N.L.R.B. 1006 (1941).
252. See RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 220(2)(g) (1933); supra note
72 and accompanying text.

253. See Stockholders, 28 N.L.R.B. at 1023.
254. See id.; see also supra note 240 and accompanying text.
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ment would be no broader under this second method of
interpretation- 55
A third interpretation of the House comment is that the committee members intended to implicate all of the prior cases in which
the Board used factors beyond those commonly associated with the
principles of agency" 6 This is the predominant explanation," 7
although this author believes that interpretation to be overly broad
because the House comment discussed no cases other than Hearst,
nor did it reflect any knowledge of the Board's other early applications of the test for employee" 8 This lack of apparent knowledge
of the Board's prior cases on the issue of independent contractor
status is consistent with the House comment's lack of understanding of the general principles of the common law of agency and its
misstatements of both the pre-NLRA common law of labor disputes and the express intent of the 1935 drafters with regard to the
meaning of employee. 259
A fourth interpretation of the House comment might be that the
House members were attempting to legislate that, under all circumstances, employees work for wages or salaries and are directly
supervised, and that independent contractors always do a job for a
price, control the details of the work, and depend upon profits for
income.260 However, this simple formula not only defies the complexity and variety of actual work arrangements (and is therefore a
useless test), it also is inconsistent with the very principles of agency
that the House instructs the Board to follow. 26 1 For instance, under
section 220 of the Restatement, the common law test requires a
weighing of whatever relevant factors may exist under the circum255. See H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 18 (1947), reprintedin 1 NLRB, LEGISLATrVE HISTORY
OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 292, 309 (1948).
256. See id.
257. See, e.g., HARDIN, supra note 250, at 1622 ("[C]ongress indicated that the Board had
exceeded the standards and intent of the original Act by including independent contractors
as employees in several cases.").
258. See H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 309.
259. These misstatements contained in the House report are in line with the conclusion of
two commentators who found that in general the House proceedings on the Taft-Hartley
amendment "did not match the difficulty of the subject," nor did it contain "adequate and
relevant analysis of the important issues presented." HARRY A. MILLIS & EMILY CLARK
BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFr-HARTLEY: A STUDY OF NATIONAL LABOR
POLICY AND LABOR RELATIONS 374, 381 (1950).

260. See H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 309.
261. See id. at 302.
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stances of each case, with no one factor being decisive. 262 Instead,
the House members seem to indicate that if a worker receives
wages, that worker is an employee, and if a worker is paid by the
job, that worker is a contractor.263 This simple construction, however, is inconsistent with the common law test. Specifically, under
the Restatement, the status of workers paid by the job depended as
much upon other factors not included in the committee's brief summary, such as the level of skill and the length of time the employment was to last.264 Moreover, the principles of agency would be
violated if the common law test were reduced to a short recitation
of oversimplified and general terms. Instead, the employeremployee relationship, the Restatement reported, "cannot ... be

defined in general terms with any substantial accuracy," and the
factors for determining independent contractor status "are all considered in determining the question, and it is for the triers of fact to
determine whether or not there is a sufficient group of favorable
factors to establish the relationship. '265 Thus, to the extent that it
may be considered inconsistent with the principles of agency, this
overly simple formulation cannot stand above the House comment's express direction that the Board must apply agency principles when deciding the status of workers under section 2(3).266
In sum, as drawn from the text of the House comment, the best
explanation of the intent of the House drafters is that they wished
the Board not to find profits to be, in economic reality, wages, and
that when the Board was to assess the status of a class of workers, it
should not disregard from the balance the fact that those workers
hire other workers.2 6 7 However, as discussed in the next subsec262. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1933).

263. See H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 309.
264. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 220 cmts. e & f (1933) (same

language retained in comments i. and j. of the Restatement (SECOND)); see also supra Part
III.A.
265. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF T=E LAW OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. b (1933) (same

language retained in comment c. of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)).
266. See H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 302.

267. Additionally, these House committee members may have been so motivated by antilabor sentiment that they were, under the guise of the precedent of agency principles,
attempting indirectly to restrain the reach of the Board's discretion. See HARDIN, supra note

219, at 37 ("[tlhe emphasis in the House hearings was an investigation of abuse by labor of its
power"). For earlier evidence of such sentiments, see REPORT OF THE SPECIAL HousE
COMMrITEE TO INVESTIGATE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,H.R. REP. No. 76-

3109 (1941).
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tion, any intent gleaned from the language of the House report ulti-

mately carries no weight in the determination of the intent of the
Taft-Hartley Congress in amending section 2(3).268 This is because

the House language was never accepted by the Senate, did not survive the conference compromises, and was omitted from269the final
Conference Committee report which was voted into law.

B. The Conference Committee Report
On June 3, 1947, the Conference Committee which hammered
out the differences between the House and Senate versions of the

1947 Taft-Hartley amendment issued its report containing the compromised provisions.270 Unlike the bill generated by the House
Committee, the Senate bill had contained no independent contrac-

tor exclusion.27 During the Conference Committee proceedings,
the Senate representatives compromised on this point and agreed

to support an express exclusion

72

The Conference Committee

report, however, rejected or watered down the language of the

House report, summarizing the reasons for the amendment as
merely the following:
The House bill excluded from the definition of "employee" individuals having the status of independent contractors. Although
independent contractors can in no sense be considered to be
268. See discussion infra Part V.B.
269. See discussion infra Part V.B.
270. See H.R. REP. No. 80-510, at 135 (1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.S. at 1135, 1135.
271. See id at 1139.
272. See id. at 1135. It would have been a fairly simple matter for the Senate members of
the Conference Committee to concede to adding an express exclusion since the Board had
always excluded independent contractors from the Act's coverage, see supra Part IV, and
because independent contractors were excluded under the principles of agency, see supra
Part III.A. Thus, the exclusion was a ready bargaining chip for the Senate members.
Moreover, there is no question that the House members of the Conference Committee
made many concessions in order to ensure passage of the bill. In explaining the results of the

Conference Committee compromises, Representative Hartley made the following comments
on the House floor:
Entirely too much emphasis has been placed on the so-called concessions that the
House conferees made during the conference. I will be very frank and say that I
agreed to some of these concessions very reluctantly. I would much rather have
seen the House bill as it originally passed enacted into law, but I want to see a bill
that can be enacted into law passed by this Congress.... I also want to make it
perfectly clear that there was no concession made except upon the assurance that it
would provide us votes in another body to be certain that the legislation would be
enacted into law.
93 CONo. Rac. 6383-84 (1947).
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employees, the Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, Inc. (1944), 322 U.S. 111, held that the ordinary tests of the
law of agency could be ignored by the Board in determining

whether or not particular occupational groups were "employees"
within the meaning of the Labor Act. Consequently it refused to
consider the question of whether certain categories of persons
whom the Board had deemed to be "employees" were not in fact
and in law really independent contractors.2 73

This reduced version of the House comment is the decisive passage
of the legislative record on the meaning of the section 2(3) exclusion because it was the portion produced by the Conference Committee and ultimately agreed upon by both the House and
Senate.2 74

Specifically, the Conference Committee rejected all of the original House language criticizing the Board, and most of the House
criticism of the Hearst opinion, leaving only its concern for adherence to agency principles. 275 This final version dropped the House
comment's discussion that contained misstatements of the intent of
the Wagner Act drafters, the pre-NLRA common law of labor disputes, and the overly simplified rendering of the principles of
agency.2 76 Instead, it contained its disagreement with the Hearst
Court to the statement that the Court had improperly held that
"the ordinary tests of the law of agency could be ignored by the
Board.

2 77

Therefore, the language of the House report that was

rejected by the Conference Committee is not an accurate statement
273. See H.R. REP No. 80-510, at 1138 (emphasis added).
274. See generally 93 CONG. REC. 6370 (1947) (demonstrating House agreement as the
House passed the proposed changes in H.R. REP No. 80-510 (1947)); id. at 6536
(demonstrating Senate agreement as the Senate passed the proposed changes in H.R. No. 80510 (1947)). For an example of Supreme Court analysis employing this principle of
determining congressional intent according to Conference Committee documents when
House and Senate bills differ, see NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec., 454 U.S. 170,18184 (1981) (holding that the language of the House proposal rejected by the Conference

Committee was not the proper source of legislative intent).
275. See H.R. REP No. 80-510, at 1138.
276. See id.
277. See id.In agreement with this view, Senator Taft entered his understanding of the

section 2(3) amendment upon the Senate record as follows:
The legal effect of the amendment therefore is merely to make clear that the

question whether or not a person is an employee is always a question of law, since
the term is not meant to embrace persons outside that category under the general

principles of the law of agency.
93 CONG. REc. 6441-42 (1947)(emphasis added).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol15/iss1/4

46

19971

Determining
Contractor
Under
Section 2(3)
Burdick: Independent
Principles of
AgencyStatus
Permit
the NLRB
to Consider

Additional Facto

of the legislative intent of the Taft-Hartley Congress on the meaning of the section 2(3) amendment. 78
Thus, the sole directive of the Taft-Hartley Congress to the Board
and the courts under the section 2(3) amendment was that the factors used to determine independent contractor status under the
NLRA must be drawn from the general principles of agency.2 79
Currently, this is also the interpretation of the legislative intent supported by the United States Supreme Court. 28 0 For instance, in
NLRB v. United Insurance, Co.,'I the Court reviewed the congressional record of the Taft-Hartley amendment to section 2(3) and
found that "[t]he obvious purpose of this amendment was to have
-the Board and the courts apply general agency principles in distinguishing between employees and independent contractors under
the Act. '28 2 More recently, the Court has unanimously upheld this
statement of the Taft-Hartley legislative intent in Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden,

3

finding that Congress amended

section 2(3) "to demonstrate that the usual common-law principles
were the keys to meaning. '
C.

The Effect of This Intent Upon the Issue of JudicialDeference

to the Board
The mandate of the Taft-Hartley Congress that the Board apply
general principles of agency to an inquiry into independent contractor status under section 2(3) confused the question of what degree
of deference the Court should apply when reviewing the Board's
application of agency principles. The reason for this confusion was
278. As a result, the holdings of cases which have extensively relied upon the House

report language in determining the legislative intent of the Taft-Hartley amendment should
be considered questionable. See, e.g., Local 777, Democratic Union Org. Comm., Seafarers
Int'l Union v. NLRB, 603 F.2d. 862 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing the House Report at 879 n.47,

903, 905, 909) (holding narrowly that the most important factor of the right-to-control test
was the extent of supervision exercised, and that no great amount of deference was due a

Board decision on independent contractor status) and its progeny, C.C. Eastern, Inc. v.
NLRB, 60 F.3d 855 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Aurora Packing Co. v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir.

1990); North Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 869 F.2d 596 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Yellow Taxi Co. v.
NLRB, 721 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983); City Cab Co. v. NLRB, 628 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

279. See H.R. REP. No. 80-510, at 135 (1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.S. at 1135, 1138;
280. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992); NLRB v. United Ins.
Co., 390 U.S. 254 (1968).
281. 390 U.S. 254 (1968).
282. Id. at 256.
283. 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
284. Id. at 324-25 (construing United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 256).
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that while the common law inquiry was generally a question of law,
the usual degree of judicial deference afforded to the Board was
based in part on the rationale that the Board was more expert than
the courts in applying the Act to matters of fact.285
In United Insurance,the Court discussed the appropriate degree
of deference to be given the Board in the independent contractor
context in the following manner:
[S]uch a determination of pure agency law involved no special
administrative expertise that a court does not possess. On the
other hand, the Board's determination was a judgment made
after a hearing with witnesses and oral argument had been held
and on the basis of written briefs. Such a determination should
not be set aside just because a court would, as an original matter,
decide the case the other way.... Here, the least that can be said

for the Board's decision is that it made a choice between two
fairly conflicting views, and under these circumstances28 6the Court
of Appeals should have enforced the Board's order.
In other words, the Court explained that when a Board decision on
independent contractor status under section 2(3) was reviewed, the
result is to be upheld as long as the Board made a choice between
two fairly conflicting views. However, because of the Court's use of
the qualifying phrase "the least that can be said," coupled with its
limited holding that the Board in this case had chosen between two
fairly conflicting views, United Insurance presents the floor on the
287
issue of deference to the Board, but not necessarily the ceiling.
Although the application of agency principles is generally a question of law, section 220 of the Restatement recognizes an exception
for cases in which employee status is less than clear:
If the inference is clear that there is, or is not, a master and servant relation, it is made by the court; otherwise the jury determines the question after instruction by the court as to the matters
of fact to be considered.288
The Court had upheld the application of this Restatement principle
in a line of cases prior to United Insurance which held or reaffirmed
the rule that agency principles were to be used for determining
285. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944); University
of Vermont v. State of Vermont, 748 F. Supp. 235, 246 (D. Vt. 1990).
286. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 260 (citations omitted).
287. See id.
288. IRSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. c (1958).
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independent contractor
status under the Federal Employer's Liabil289
(FELA).
ity Act
First, in Baker v. Texas and Pacific Railroad Co.,290 citing section
220 of the Restatement as the source of agency principles, the
Court held that the status determination was a question for the jury
to decide, and that "[o]nly if reasonable men could not reach differing conclusions on the issue may the question be taken from the
jury."29 ' Second, in Ward v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. ,292
again citing section 220 of the Restatement and citing Baker, the
Court reaffirmed that the question of independent contractor status
under FELA was a question "for determination by the jury on the
basis of all relevant factors."29 3 Finally, in Kelley v. Southern Pacific
Co.,294 the Court reaffirmed these Baker and Ward holdings3 95

Because United Insurance did not overrule this well established
agency principle derived from the Baker line of cases-that if reasonable minds could differ, then the question of independent contractor status was an issue of fact for the jury to decide, it is likely
that the Court in United Insurance meant no reasoned divergence
from the rule. Moreover, United Insurance can be read to be consistent with the Baker principle because it did yield to the Board on
a question of fact involving "two fairly conflicting views" upon
which reasonable minds could differ.296

Under this Restatement principle applied by the Court in the
Baker line of cases and not overruled by or inconsistent with the
degree of deference afforded by the Court in United Insurance, the
Board should receive deference where it decides questions of fact
as a jury would decide them, rather than questions of law as rendered by a judge. In practice, most if not all cases heard by the
Board on the issue of independent contractor status involve close

289. See Kelley v. Southern Pac. Co., 419 U.S. 318 (1974); Ward v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 362 U.S. 396 (1960); Baker v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 359 U.S. 227 (1959).
290. 359 U.S. 227 (1959).
291. Id. at 228.
292. 362 U.S. 396 (1960).
293. Id. at 400.
294. 419 U.S. 318 (1974).
295. See id.
at 323-24, 324 n.5.
296. See NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 260 (1968).
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cases of fact which rise on appeal from disputed ALJ decisions. 2 97
Therefore, there is a strong argument that deference to the Board
should be presumed in all of its decisions on independent contractor
status because these decisions involve close questions of fact with
which reasonable minds could differ.
Despite this question of the exact amount of deference to afford
the Board's findings on independent contractor status, there is no
question that the Court has retained for the Board, the usual degree
of deference due to the findings of an administrative agency when

reviewing questions concerning the interpretation of section 2(3)
outside the independent contractor context. In Sure-Tan, Inc. v.
NLRB,298 for example, the Court held that undocumented workers
were employees within the meaning of section 2(3) of the Act. 9 9
Quoting Hearst for the proposition that "the task of defining the
term 'employee' is one that 'has been assigned primarily to the
agency created by Congress to administer the Act,"3 0° the Court

held that "the Board's construction of that term [employee] is entitled to considerable deference, and we will uphold any interpretation that is reasonably defensible."' 3 1 Later, in NLRB v. Town &
297. See Baker, 359 U.S. at 228 (stating "[e]ach case must be decided on its peculiar facts
and ordinarily no one feature of the relationship is determinative") (quoting Cimorelli v.
New York Cent. R. Co., 148 F.2d 575, 577 (1945)).
298. 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
299. See id. at 891-94.
300. Id. at 891 (quoting NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944)).
This principle enunciated in Hearst, that the Board had been assigned the primary task of
interpreting the Act, was upheld consistently by the Court in the years following the TaftHartley amendment. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 496 (1979) (stating
that "Congress made a conscious decision to continue its delegation to the Board of the
primary responsibility of marking out the scope of the statutory language," and that "the
primary function and responsibility of the Board" was to apply the "general provisions of the
Act to the complexities of industrial life" with its "special understanding"); NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963) (stating "as in other cases, we must recognize the
Board's special function of applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of
industrial life," involving "an issue which Congress had placed in its hands"); NLRB v. Truck
Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957) (stating "[t]he function of striking that balance to
effectuate national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the
Congress committed primarily to the National Labor Relations Board").
301. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 891; see also FordMotor Co., 441 U.S. at 497 (holding that as
long as the Board's "construction of the statute is reasonably defensible, it should not be
rejected merely because the courts might prefer another view"); NLRB v. Local Union No.
103, Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 350 (1978) (holding that the Board's construction of § 8 of
the Act represented "a defensible construction of the statute and is entitled to considerable
deference").
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Country Electric,3" 2 the Court again relied on this same passage
from Hearst, holding that paid union organizers working for the

company that was targeted for unionization were within the definition of employee under section 2(3).3 In Holly Farms Corp. v.
NLRB, °4 the Court continued the use of this principle, stating that
"[flor the Board to prevail, it need not show that its construction is
the best way to read the statute; rather, courts must respect the
305
Board's judgment so long as its reading is a reasonable one.1
Therefore, although the degree of deference afforded Board decisions on independent contractor status was left somewhat unclear
by United Insurance, there is no question that the Board will be
given the usual degree of agency deference for inquiries into the
meaning of employee outside of the independent contractor
context.
VI.

PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY PERMIT THE BOARD TO CONSIDER
ADDITIONAL FACTORS OF ENTREPRENEURIAL
INDEPENDENCE AND THE RELATIVE
DEPENDENCE OF EMPLOYEES

In the consolidated cases of Roadway III and Dial-A-Mattress,
the Board asked the parties to brief these questions: Does the
Board have the authority to change or modify the standard for
determining independent contractor status under the NLRA? If so,
should any changes or modifications be made?"0 6 This section
argues that the traditional principles of agency allow the Board to
consider certain additional and relevant factors in its inquiry into
independent contractor status. While the fundamental criteria
should remain the currently recognized factors summarized in section 220 of the Restatement, the Board may expand its inquiry to
include facts that tend to prove the independence associated with
entrepreneurs and the dependence coincident with employee status.
Further, the Board's ability to draw upon these additional inquiries
is bolstered by recent Supreme Court cases.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

516 U.S. 85 (1995).
See id. at 94 (quoting Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 891 (quoting Hearst,322 U.S. at 130)).
116 S. Ct. 1396 (1996).
Id. at 1406 (citing Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 891).
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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A.

Principles of Agency Support the Use of Factors of
EntrepreneurialIndependence

In general, the common law principles, as reduced by the
Restatement and reported in section 220, are not a closed set of
inquiries. The introductory language of section 220(2) states "[i]n
determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an
independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among
others, are considered.""3 7 This open ended collection of factors
used by various courts at common law allows a trier of fact to consider other facts relevant to the inquiry. This design recognizes that
"[t]he relation of master and servant is one not capable of exact
definition," and that this relationship cannot be defined "in general
terms with substantial accuracy."3 0 "[I]t is for the triers of fact to
determine whether or not there is a sufficient group of favorable
'30 9
factors to establish the relation.
The flexible balancing of the common law test has been described
by the Supreme Court in United Insurance in the following manner:
In such a situation as this there is no shorthand formula or magic
phrase that can be applied to find the answer, but all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no
one factor being decisive. What is important is that the total factual context is assessed in light of the pertinent common-law
agency principles.3 10
Thus, the common law test for defining the line between employee
and independent contractor provides a flexible balancing of factors
which each judge is relatively free to apply given the facts of each
case. By expressly stating that the determination is not limited to
the listed inquiries, the Restatement acknowledges the complexity
of assessing the difficult and varying factual situations with which a
trier of fact often is faced when determining independent contractor status.3 11 The common law test, in other words, is necessarily
flexible to meet and measure the corresponding complexity of work
307. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958) (same language
used in RESTATEMENT (FIRST)).
308. RESTATEMENT (SEcoIND)

OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. c

(1958)

(same

language used in comment b. of the RESTATEMENT (FIRST)).

309. See id.
310. NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968) (upholding the Board's finding
that insurance agents were employees under § 2(3) of the Act).
311. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958).
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relations. Moreover, the open ended aspect of the inquiry springs
from its common law nature which allows the test to evolve as
judges are confronted with evaluating varying fact patterns as well
as greater changes in the conditions of society and developments in
the American workplace.
These principles of the common law of agency which give broad
discretion to the trier of fact and allow the inclusion of other relevant facts, provide the Board, as a trier of fact, with the option of
considering additional factors in the balance of its common law
determination of independent contractor status.312 Under these
principles, the Board is not restricted from considering additional
facts concerning either entrepreneurial independence or the relative dependence of employees.
The use of facts tending to indicate independence or dependence
are supported under the principles of agency by their logical connection to the inquiry of who is or is not an independent contractor.
In this sense, relevant facts pointing toward the independence of a
worker are closely related to the nature of control, which is, of
course, a central consideration of the common law test. In other
words, signs of independence-or indications of lack of controlare simply the flip side of the traditional control factor. Just as a
trier of fact might frame the control inquiry as whether the
employer controls the worker, this same inquiry can be informed by
facts indicating the worker is not controlled and is therefore
independent of the employer to a degree that would in the balance,
cause the worker to be designated an independent contractor.
Also, these entrepreneurial inquiries are consistent with the
traditional definition of an independent contractor as stated at common law. For instance, a 1923 treatise summarized an independent
contractor in the following manner:
[The independent contractor is] one who exercises some
independent calling, occupation, or employment, in the course of
which he undertakes, supplying his own materials, servants and
equipment, to accomplish a certain result, not being subject while
doing so to the direction and control of his employer, but being
responsible to his employer for the end to be
achieved, and not
313
for the means by which he accomplishes it.
312. See id.
313. FLOYD R. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 13 (1923).
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This "independent calling, occupation, or employment" factor is
therefore an ancient resident of the common law of agency, and as
such is a viable tool for today's triers of fact.
In fact, the Board and the Court have at times applied factors of
entrepreneurial independence.314 For instance, the early Board in
Seattle Post, its first determination of independent contractor status
under the Act, considered relevant the fact that motor route drivers
had "no real interest in the business" of the newspaper, and that
whatever interest they did have in the delivery subscription lists
could be terminated at will by the publisher who held title to the
lists.3 15 Likewise, in Stockholders Publishing Co., the Board found
relevant the fact that the newsboys had "no vested interest in the
newspaper business" that one might expect from entrepreneurs.3" 6
Also, in Seattle Post,the Board noted in its balance of facts that the
motor route drivers were not allowed by their employers to act as
representatives of competing newspapers without the company's
consent.3 17

In United Insurance,the Court noted that the insurance agents in
question "do not have the independence, nor are they allowed the
initiative and decision-making authority, normally associated with
an independent contractor."3 Then, in its list of "decisive factors"
weighing in favor of a finding of independent contractor status
under section 2(3) of the Act, the Court recognized two
entrepreneurial considerations: (1) that "the agents do not operate
their own independent businesses, but perform functions that are
an essential part of the company's normal operations," and (2) that
'319
"they do business in the company's name.
Following United Insurance, the Board began to increase its use
of entrepreneurial considerations. 2 ° Most recently, in Roadway 1,
314. See Seattle Post Intefligencer Dep't of Hearst Publications, Inc., 9 N.L.R.B. 1262,
1275 (1938); see also supra Part IV.A.

315. See Seattle Post, 9 N.L.R.B. at 1275; see also supra Part IV.A.
316. See Stockholders Publishing Co., Inc., 28 N.L.R.B. 1006, 1023 (1941); see also supra
Part IV.B.2.
317. See Seattle Post, 9 N.L.R.B. at 1275.
318. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 258 (emphasis added).
319. Id. at 258-59.
320. See, e.g., Richard C. Tmney, Annotation, Trucker as Independent Contractor or

Employee Under § 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 USCS § 152(3)), 55 A.L.R.
FED. 20 § 7 (1981) (discussing work done by truckers as a distinct trade or business); id. at
§ 15 (discussing opportunities for profit or loss).
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the Board included "the drivers' relative lack of entrepreneurial
freedom" as a fact relevant to its finding that a class of delivery
drivers were employees.321 Relevant facts indicating entrepreneurial independence, however, will vary from case to case
depending on the exact circumstances of each work arrangement,
and therefore should not be restricted to only those facts recognized in prior cases.322
The use of such facts indicating the entrepreneurial independence of true independent contractors, when coupled with the
application of the factors listed in section 220 of the Restatement,
refine the inquiry into independent contractor status under section
2(3) and will produce a more exact evaluation of the reality of the
work relationship. Moreover, this mix of factors presents a more
accurate tool for determining independent contractor status in light
of its many new and developing forms in today's complex economy.
B. Principles of Agency Also Support the Use of Factors
Indicating the Relative Dependence of Employees
The flexible nature of an inquiry into independent contractor status under the common law principles collected in section 220 of the
Restatement also allows consideration of additional factors indicating the relative dependence of employees. 3 Consideration of facts
indicating the relative dependence of employees is merely the natural and logical reverse of the inquiry into the independence of contractors. Because in close cases the status inquiry requires scrutiny
of facts tending to show which side of the line between employees
and independent contractors the workers in question properly fall,
a logical resident of that analysis is the underlying question,
'
"independent or dependent?"324
Generally, workers who are true independent contractors are not
as relatively dependent upon their employers as are workers in
traditional employee arrangements. Further, because the employeremployee relationship is by necessity largely framed on an economic basis, this dependence often is defined in economic terms.
For example, the general categories of facts indicating the economic
321. See Roadway Package Systems, Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 196, 198-99 (1988); see also supra
notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
322. See, e.g., Roadway Package Systems, Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 196 (1988).
323. See RESrATEmENT (SEcoND) OF THE LAW OF ArENc § 220 (1958).
324. Id.
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dependence of employees acknowledged in Hearst were those facts
tending to establish (1) helplessness in dealing with an employer,
(2) dependence upon wages from the employer, (3) an inability to
leave the employment relationship without severe economic consequences, (4) an incapacity to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment,
and (5) the potential to benefit from collective bargaining.Y In
fact, a worker of true entrepreneurial status would not suffer under
similar conditions. For example, contractors who are truly
independent readily can sever the business relationship and take
their services and equipment elsewhere when faced with unfair or
arbitrary treatment, or unfavorable working conditions. 326 They
usually have contracts with more than one company, or contract
with one company on a full-time basis for short durations, and consequently are not dependent on a single employer in the same allor-nothing fashion as traditional employees who tend to work on a
full-time basis for an indefinite term. Because of these characteristics of independence, a true contractor does not suffer the effects of
unequal bargaining power to any degree comparable to that suffered by employees, and thus would find little benefit in bargaining
collectively. In fact, the principle of collective bargaining is antithetical to the business of a contractor whose livelihood depends
upon the ability to underbid competing entrepreneurs, rather than
join with them in concert.
Thus, inquiries into the relative dependence of employees could
properly include facts of an economic character since work arrangements by their nature are economic and because employees are relatively more dependent upon an employer than are independent
contractors. Independent contractors tend to have contracts of
short duration, work for more than one company, and hold a vested
interest in their livelihood that is retained once the work arrangement ends. The relative dependence of employees is merely the flip
side of the independent contractor coin and is therefore rooted in
our common law understanding of the distinctions between employees and independent contractors. As such, facts indicating the relative dependency of employees can assist a trier of fact in
differentiating employees from independent contractors in the same
way that facts demonstrating independence assist the common law
325. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
326. See American Steel Foundaries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209
(1921).
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inquiry. Appropriately then, these facts are available to the Board,
as a trier of fact, in a section 2(3) inquiry into independent contractor status under the agency principles as outlined in the
Restatement.
C. The Supreme Court View
Currently, the Supreme Court has unanimously recognized the
flexible nature of agency principles as guided by the Restatement's
rendering of the common law test. Additionally it has left open the
possible inclusion of additional facts under the inquiry, by noting
that section 220 contains a non-exhaustive list of factors, and has
enunciated a unifying principle which indicates that the Board may
freely move to accept the more flexible approach of the application
32 7
of agency principles as summarized in the Restatement.
As discussed previously, the sole directive of the Taft-Hartley
Congress to the Board and the courts under the section 2(3)
amendment was that the factors used to determine independent
contractor status under the NLRA must be drawn from the general
principles of agency. 328 In recent years, the Supreme Court has
upheld this interpretation of legislative intent, finding in United
Insurance that "[t]he obvious purpose of this amendment was to
have the Board and the courts apply general agency principles in
distinguishing between employees and independent contractors
under the Act, ' 32 9 and holding in Darden that Congress amended
section 2(3) "to demonstrate that the usual common-law principles
were the keys to meaning."330
Three years before Darden,in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,3 3 ' Justice Marshall wrote for the unanimous Court
stating that the meaning of the term "scope of employment" under
the Copyright Act of 1976 was to be construed by general principles
of the common law of agency when determining independent contractor status.3 32 The rationale for its holding, the Court stated, was
the general rule that "when Congress has used the term 'employee'
327. See REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
328. See supra Part V.B.

329. NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968).
330. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 325 (1992)(quoting United Ins.

Co., 390 U.S. at 256).
331. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
332. See id. at 739-40.
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without defining it, we have concluded that Congress intended to
relationship as underdescribe the conventional master-servant
333
stood by common-law agency doctrine.

Then, in Darden, also writing for the unanimous Court, Justice
Souter clarified the importance of the rule set out in Reid.334 In his
discussion of the intent of Congress in expressly excluding
independent contractors under the NLRA after Hearst, as well as
the amendment of the Social Security Act after Silk,335 Justice Souter explained:
To be sure, Congress did not, strictly speaking, "overrule" our
interpretation of those statutes, since the Constitution invests the
Judiciary, not the Legislature, with the final power to construe
the law. But a principle of statutory construction can endure just
so many legislative revisitations, and Reid's presumption that
Congress means an agency law definition for "employee" unless
it clearly indicates otherwise signaled our abandonment of Silk's
emphasis on construing that term "'in the light
of the mischief to
336
be corrected and the end to be attained."'

With this passage, Dardenmade clear that an inquiry into the purposes and policies of the federal labor laws in the analysis of
independent contractor status was untenable,337 at long last expressly rejecting the proposition of Hearst and Silk that the content
of the term 'employee' in the context of a particular federal statute
is "to be construed 'in the light of the mischief to be corrected and
333. Id.
334. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 325.
335. United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947); see also supra note 210.
336. Darden, 503 U.S. at 325 (quoting Silk, 331 U.S. at 713 (quoting Hearst, 322 U.S. at
124)).
337. See id. at 323. The Court, however, has retained an inquiry into the purposes of the
NLRA when reviewing questions concerning § 2(3)'s interpretation outside of the
independent contractor context. Similar in principle to the old common law axiom set out in
1914 by Judge Learned Hand that "where all the conditions of the relation require
protection, protection ought to be given," Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547,
552-53 (2d Cir. 1914), was the recent cautionary note of Justice Ginsburg in Holly Farms v.
NLRB, 116 S.Ct. 1396, 1401 (1996), that "administrators and reviewing courts must take care
to assure that exemptions from NLRA coverage are not so expansively interpreted as to
deny protection to workers the Act was designed to reach" (discussing the § 2(3) exemption
for agricultural workers). Analogous also was Justice O'Connor's statement in Sure-Tan Inc.
v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984), that extending the coverage of § 2(3) to undocumented
aliens was "consistent with the Act's avowed purpose of encouraging and protecting the
collective bargaining process" (citing Hearst, 322 U.S. at 126).
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the end to be attained." 338 More importantly, the Darden Court
also announced its acceptance of the Reid presumption as a new

unifying rule that if Congress enacts a federal labor law using the
term "employee" without defining it, then the general principles of

agency are
to be applied in determining independent contractor
9
33

status.

Traditionally, the Court has looked to the Restatement as the

source of guidance for the content and application of the general
principles of common law agency. 3 40 Recently, the Court has reaf-

firmed this method of utilizing section 220 of the Restatement in
determining independent contractor status in its Reid and Darden

opinions, and has stressed the open-ended nature of the inquiry. 4 '
In Reid, for example, the unanimous Court cited the "non-exhaustive list of factors" of section 220(2) as the reference for the common law principles of agency that were to be used to determine
employee or independent contractor status under the Copyright
Act of 1976.342 Three years later, in Darden, the unanimous Court
adopted the Reid approach for interpreting the common law test for
independent contractor status in the statutory context of the
338. Silk, 331 U.S. at 713 (quoting Hearst, 322 U.S. at 124); cf United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at
256 (stating that Hearst had stood for the proposition that a determination of independent
contractor status required an inquiry into "'the history, terms and purposes of the
legislation"') (quoting Hearst, 322 U.S. at 124).
339. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 323.
340. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 752 n.31 (1989)
(citing Kelley v. Southern Pac. Co., 419 U.S. 318, 323-24, 323 n.5 (1974)) (citing Baker for the
rule that common law principles were to be used to determine the employer-employee
relationship under the Federal Employer's Liability Act); Ward v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.
Co.), 362 U.S. 396, 400 (1960) (citing the RSTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY
§ 220 (1958) as the source of agency principles for determining independent contractor status
under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, and stating that the determination is for a jury to
make after considering all of the relevant factors among others); Baker v. Texas & Pacific Ry.
Co., 359 U.S. 227, 228 (1959) (citing the REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF Ta LAW OF AGENCY
§ 220 (1958) as the source of agency principles for determining independent contractor status
under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, and stating that the determination is for a jury to
make and the question may be taken from the jury only if reasonable persons could not reach
differing conclusions)).
341. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-24; Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-53.
342. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-53 (holding that a sculptor hired to create a work of art
according to the general specifications of an organization's members was an independent
contractor under the Copyright Act because, according to section 220 factors, the sculptor
was highly skilled, provided his own tools, worked in his own studio, for whatever hours he
chose to work, with no daily supervision, and was retained only for a short two-month time
period by an organization that did not have the right to assign the sculptor additional
projects, nor was sculpture its regular business).
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Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), again
citing the Restatement's list of "non-exhaustive criteria for identifying [the] master-servant relationship."343
In sum, the Darden Court announced its adoption of the Reid
rule as a unifying principle that the general common law of agency
is to be applied in defining employee where Congress has used the
term in federal labor legislation without supplying a definition. 44
The Court has further made clear that the Restatement is a proper
source of these general principles, but that the common law test is a
flexible inquiry and that section 220 presents a non-exhaustive list
of factors to guide but not restrain a trier of fact in determining the
often close line between employee and independent contractor status under the federal labor laws in which Congress left the term
undefined.45
Because the Wagner Act Congress did not supply an express definition of employee under the NLRA, and because the Taft-Hartley
Congress corrected this deficiency by explaining that it intended
that the general common law principles of agency were to define
the term's meaning, and in light of the recent Court's announcement of this unifying rule that the common law principles are to be
applied under the federal labor laws in which Congress did not provide an express definition, the Board is now in the position to
accept this Supreme Court doctrine and announce its adoption of
the flexible and open ended version of the common law test set out
in the Restatement and interpreted by the Court.346 Such a move is
343. Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-24.

344. See id. at 322-23.
345. See id. at 323-24.
346. The Board's acceptance of the Court's announcement of the unifying rule of Reid
and Darden and its express adoption of the flexible version of the common law test, as
explained by those cases, will also require the Board to explicitly reject the restrictive rightto-control test that is still being applied by the District of Columbia Circuit. See Local 777,
Democratic Union Org. Comm., Seafarers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 603 F.2d. 862 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (holding narrowly that the most important factor in determining independent
contractor status is the right to control), and its progeny, C.C. Eastern, Inc. v. NLRB, 60 F.3d

855 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Aurora Packing v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1990); North
American Van Lines, Inc., v. NLRB, 869 F.2d 596 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Yellow Taxi Co. v.

NLRB, 721 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983); City Cab Co. v. NLRB, 628 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Under the right-to-control test, an employer's right to control and direct the physical
movements of a worker is the most important factor in the independent contractor inquiry.
See Local 777,603 F.2d at 874-75 (quoting WAaEN A. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw o

AGENCY 142 (1964)). By placing so much emphasis on the right-to-control, the doctrine
improperly rejected the common law principle explained in the Restatement that the listed
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supported by the trend of Supreme Court precedent, and should be
upheld by the Court upon review. This advance toward a unifying
test for independent contractor status also brings the obvious
advantage of creating a more consistent, lateral definition of
employee among the highly splintered interpretations of the term
presently used under the various federal labor laws that do not
include an express definition. Moreover, the unifying test will provide the flexibility needed to adapt to and interpret the diversity of
today's evolving forms of employment arrangements.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The common law principles of agency provide a flexible method
of addressing today's expanded use of independent contractors and
the increasing variety of alternative employment relationships
which in many instances have the effect of exempting workers from
the employee protections that Congress intended for them. This
flexible system of factors has particular importance in resolving the
employer classification schemes arising in the NLRA context where
the insufficiency of an overly rigid set of factors may at times result
in outcomes inconsistent with the true nature of the employment
relationship.
Under current Supreme Court precedent, the Board may
broaden its inquiry under the non-exhaustive criteria of section 220
of the Restatement to include additional factors which more precisely focus on the independence of a true contractor and the
dependence of a genuine employee. Such an inquiry should be
firmly centered upon the existing factors listed in section 220 of the
Restatement and incorporate other relevant facts that may assist
the Board in assessing the nature of the work arrangement. This
response by the Board to the changed circumstances of today's
factors "are all considered in determining the question,"

RPTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF THE

LAv OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. c. (1958), and is inconsistent with the principle recognized by the

Court that "all the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one
factor being decisive." NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968); see also Reid, 490
U.S. at 752. Further, in deciding its Local 777 holding, the D.C. Circuit quoted the following

passage from Seavey's treatise: "The right to control the physical movements of the
employee is the most important single element in most of the situations." Local 777, 603 F.2d
at 875 (quoting WARREN A. SEAV EY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 142 (1964)).
However, the court failed to consider the following statement presented on the same page of
that treatise: "Even the right to control the physical activity of the employee, which in many
cases is determinative, has been disregarded ....

" SEAVEY, at 142.
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employment relations and the increased variety of employment
forms is an appropriate adjustment in light of its role as the primary
interpreter of the Act and is consistent with the intent of the TaftHartley amendment directing the Board to apply principles of
agency. In fact, in the unanimous cases of Reid and Darden, the
Court upheld the use of the open ended system of Restatement factors, and announced the unifying rule that the principles of agency,
as referenced by the Restatement, are to be applied to the term
"employee" in all federal labor statutes in which Congress did not
provide an express definition. Thus, under the present view of the
Court, the intent of the 1947 Congress, and the unambiguous wording of the Restatement, the Board may under the principles of
agency expand its section 2(3) inquiry into independent contractor
status to include additional factors demonstrating entrepreneurial
independence and the relative dependence of employees.
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